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CANON LAW AND THE HUMAN PERSON
Rev. John J. Coughlin, O.F.M f
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the unity of law and theology in the 1983
Code of Canon Law [hereinafter CIC-1983].' The unity has remained
critical since canon law emerged in the ancient Church.2 From the
origins of the primitive Christian communities through the patristic era,
the Church manifested a tension between charism and office, spirit and
law? The medieval canonists achieved a great synthesis of the reason of
law and faith of theology.4 The unified theory helped to form the basis
t Professor of Law, Notre Dame University School of Law. J.C.D., J.C.L., Pontifical
Gregorian University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Th.M., Princeton Theological Seminary; M.A.,
Columbia University; B.A., Niagara University. The author wishes to thank Monsignor William
J. Toohy, Esq., and Professors John Finnis, M. Cathleen Kaveny and John Mansfield for their
many helpful suggestions.
1. Codex furis Canonici auctoritate Joannis Pauli Pp. Ilpromulgatus (Die 25 m. ianuarii a.
1983), 75 Acta Apostolicae Sedis [hereinafter AAS] II, 1-317 (1983). Canon law attempts to set
the optimal conditions for the social order of the ecclesiastical community and its individual
members. loannes Paulus Pp. II, "Constitutio Apostolica Sacrae Disciplinae Leges" (Die 25 m.
ianuarii a. 1983), 75 AAS II, xi (1983) (Canon law "looks towards the achievement of order in the
ecclesial society, such that while attributing a primacy to love, grace and charisms, it facilitates at
the same time an orderly development in the life both of the ecclesial society and of the individual
persons who belong to it."). English translations of the CIC-1983 and the Apostolic Constitution
Sacrae Disciplinae Leges are taken from Code of Canon Law Annotated: Latin-English Edition of
the Code of Canon Law and English-Language Translation of the 5th Spanish-Language Edition
of the Commentary Prepared under the Responsibility of the Instituto Martin de Azpilcueta
(Ernest Caparros, Michel Th~riault & Jean Thorn eds., Wilson & Lafleur Limit~e 1993).
2. Eugenio Corecco, The Theology of Canon Law: A Methodological Question 4 (Francesco
Turvasi trans., Duquesne U. Press 1992) (discussing canon law's historical development and
concluding that "[t]he problem of the unity of law has become central to the Christian philosophy
of law and to the theology of canon law.").
3. This is not to suggest that the tension was unhealthy or has not continued to be an
important factor in the life of the Church to the present time. Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy
Spirit vol. 2, 11 (David Smith trans., Seabury Press 1983) (discussing the tension between charism
and institution); Henri de Lubac, The Splendour of the Church 85-125 (Michael Mason trans.,
Paulist Press 1956) (discussing the tension between the visible and invisible aspects of the
Church); Stephan Kuttner, Some Considerations on the Role of Secular Law and Institutions in the
History of Canon Law, in Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law 351, 356-357 (Variorum
1990) (observing that, while the medievals first developed a systematic approach to canon law, the
primitive and ancient Church from its institution was both a spiritual communion and corporate
society with the existence of a sacramental and jurisdictional law).
4. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and
Church Law 1150-1625, at 343 (Scholars Press 1997) ("The idea of natural rights grew up ... in
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of the Western legal tradition.' The Reformation focus on sola fide
(faith alone) tended to sever the unity.6 With the Enlightenment, reason
was declared independent from the unproven dogma of faith.7 Modem
Western legal theory developed in accord with Enlightenment thought.8
As a result of canon law's function in the life of the Church, the
continuing issue of the unity has produced two interrelated principles.9
Theology without law leaves the ecclesiastical community bereft of an
ordered life. Law without theological meaning surrenders its moral
a religious culture that supplemented rational argumentation about human nature with a faith in
which humans were seen as children of a caring God."); and R.H. Helmholz, The Spirit of
Classical Canon Law 398 (U. Ga. Press 1996) (medieval canon law "was designed to guide
Christians toward right conduct as well as to establish an objective order with definite legal
consequences").
5. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
85-254 (Harv. U. Press 1983) (describing how the eleventh and twelfth centuries' "renaissance" in
the study of law lead to a system of canon law that formed the basis of the Western legal
tradition); James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law 4 (Longman 1995) (noting that canonical
private and public law contributed to the most basic institutions of modern constitutional
government); and Marcia L. Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition
400-1400 at 326-351 (Yale U. Press 1997) (discussing the many ways in which medieval culture
and law contributed to the economic and political theory of the Western intellectual tradition).
6. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 85 (describing Luther's doctrine of the two separate kingdoms,
one of which is ruled by faith and the other by reason). From the Reformation, a polemic
developed concerning the nature of the early Church. Reflective of the polemic, the German
historian Rudolph Sohm had advanced the thesis that prior to the twelfth century the Church was a
theological and spiritual rather than legal and juridic community. However, Stephan Kuttner
observed: "When Sohm failed to see the operation of the 'legal' element in the earlier canon law,
this is due in part to his denial ... of the existence of a sacramental and a jurisdictional aspect in
the law of the primitive and the ancient Church." Kuttner, supra n. 3, at 356-357.
7. Since the time of the Enlightenment, religion and faith have been increasingly seen as
private matters best retired from the realm of public discourse. David Tracy, Blessed Rage for
Order: The New Pluralism in Theology 4-10 (Seabury Press 1979) (describing the process of
"secularization" of Western society beginning with "the Enlightenment's demand for freedom
from oppressive authorities and freedom for autonomous, critical, rational thought"); and Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 241 (Seabury Press 1982) (discussing the Enlightenment
critique of the traditional assumptions based on Christianity and the Bible).
8. This is consistent with the thought of Walter Ullmann, who argues that the view of
individuals with autonomous and individual rights was an Enlightenment idea, foreign to the
Middle Ages. In contrast, Brian Tiemey suggests that the medieval canon law contains the origins
of individual rights theory. Helmholz, supra n. 4, at 306 (describing the respective positions of
Ullmann and Tierney); and John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory 133-138
(Oxford U. Press 1998) (discussing the meanings of ius in the medieval theologian Thomas
Aquinas). While the discussion is important, the point above is that modem Western law
developed primarily in accord with Enlightenment political theory. The empirical approach of
thinkers such as Locke and Hume did not depend on the traditional religious sources and beliefs.
See generally Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy: From the
French Enlightenment to Kant vol. 6, 1-4 (Image Books 1994) (discussing the empiricism of
French and English eighteenth-century thought).
9. Ladislas Orsy, Theology and Canon Law: New Horizons for Legislation and
Interpretation 170 (Liturgical Press 1992) (describing the "organic connection" between canon
law and theology as an "ontological fact").
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persuasiveness and deteriorates into rigid legalism.
Vatican II required a new universal law for the Church that avoided
the pitfalls of both antinomianism and legalism. The Preparatory
Commission for the CIC-1983 described canon law as a "sacred
symbol."' When he promulgated the new Code, His Holiness John Paul
II termed the legislation "the final document of Vatican II."" Affirming
the unity of law and theology, the Supreme Legislator has drawn
attention to the concept of "theological anthropology."'' 2  The phrase
signifies the endeavor to uncover the fundamental elements of what it
means to be human. 3 In exploring the unity of law and theology, this
article focuses on the relationship between canon law and theological
anthropology. While obviously not intended as a repudiation of
mainstream legal theory, the article also suggests that the unity may
offer comparative insight to the secularity of the modem project.
A. Theological Anthropology
Aware of the Enlightenment critique, a twentieth-century form of
Catholic thought focused upon the elements of theological
anthropology.'4 Theological anthropology recognizes the human person
10. Pontifical Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law, 11 Communicationes
67, 79 (1979) ("In the mystery of the Church the law has the function of a sacred symbol that
signifies and promotes the spiritual life of Christians.").
11. Giovanni Paolo H, II Diritto Canonico inserisce il Coneilio nella nostra vita, 15
Communicationes 128 (1983) ("[u]ltimo documento conciliare").
12. loannes Paulus Pp. II, "Allocutiones: I. Ad Rotae Romanae Auditores coram admissos
(Die 5 m. februarii a. 1987)," 79 AAS 1453, 1454-1458 (1987) (stating that canon law must flow
from the essential elements of theological anthropology); "Allocutiones: XII, Ad Romanae Rotae
Auditores simul cum officialibus et advocatis coram admissos, anno forensi ineunte (Die 25 m.
ianuarii a. 1988)," 80 AAS 1178, 1180-1181 (1988) (urging that canon law should reflect an
"integrated concept of the person" in accord with theological anthropology, which strives to
enhance both natural and transcendent values); Richard Barrett, The Philosophical
Presuppositions of the Code, 89 Periodica 491, 522-523 (2000) (observing that Pope John Paul's
focus on theological anthropology offers the possibility of a coherent foundation and starting point
for canonical discussion); and Gianfranco Ghirlanda, I1 diritto nella Chiesa mistero di comunione:
Compendio di Diritto Ecclesiale 15-29 (Cinisello Balsamo 1990) (describing the "anthropological
foundation" of canon law).
13. Theological anthropology adopted the methodological turn to the subject. Man
(Anthropology) in Encyclopedia of Theology 880 (Karl Ralmer ed., Seabury Press 1975)
(theological anthropology is "man's explanation of himself').
14. E.g. Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man 326 (Lancelot
Sheppard & Elizabeth Englund trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (suggesting that the social character
and unitary nature of Catholic dogma does not diminish but enhances the human person); Congar,
supra n. 3, at 66 (recalling his thought on the eve of Vatican II that "Christian anthropology
includes a whole theology of man's image being reshaped"); Karl Rahner, Foundations of
Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity 24-115 (William V. Dych trans.,
Seabury Press 1978) (focusing on the experience of the human person as essential to
communicating revelation in the modem world); and Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theological
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as an irreducible unity of body and soul. 5 Contrary to any reductionistic
understanding, the human person is more than mere biology or
rationality.16 The body, intellect and will comprise a dynamic whole of
the human person as "spirit-in-flesh."' 7
Anthropology 43-102 (Sheed & Ward 1967) (suggesting that the language of God is perfectly
expressed in the "human wholeness" of Christ). This is not to suggest that these twentieth-century
theologians were consciously working in concert as part of a larger systematic project. To be
sure, they were writing from diverse perspectives, and there are significant differences in their
thought. Some of the theological contributors to the endeavor found that their work was met with
censure from ecclesiastical authority. A shift transpired at Vatican H (1963-65), when the 1965
document Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, in Vatican
Council I: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents 903, 913-914, 917-918 & 922-924
(Austin Flannery ed., Liturgical Press 1992), incorporated the turn to the human subject. ttienne
Fouilloux, The Antepreparatory Phase: The Slow Emergence from Inertia (January, 1959-
October, 1962), in History of Vatican II vol. 1, 72-132 (Giuseppe Alberigo & Joseph A.
Komonchak eds., Orbis Books 1995) (discussing the influence of theological experts which set the
stage for the theological renewal at Vatican 11); and Giacomo Martina, The Historical Context in
Which the Idea of a New Ecumenical Council Was Born, in Vatican 11: Assessment and
Perspectives Twenty-Five Years After (1962-1987) vol. 1, 3 (Rend Latourelle ed., Paulist Press
1988) (describing the historical evolution of the theological thought and official reaction in the
years leading to Vatican I). This shift was solidified with the papacy of John Paul 11, and
theological anthropology now constitutes a standard feature of Catholic thought.
15. The new form of Catholic thought was rooted in the tradition especially in the work of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-H, 109, 1 & 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1947) [hereinafter Summa Theological (discussing
the relationship between the human soul and body); Summa Theologica I, 76, 89 (discussing the
unity of the human being as body and soul); and Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas 196 (L.K. Shook trans., Random House 1956) ("The union of soul and body is so
close that the soul compenetrates or envelops the body to the point of being wholly present in each
of its parts."). St. Thomas built his theological and philosophical system on Aristotle's cosmology
and, on the basis of these assumptions, he articulated a theory of the human person. Modem
philosophy and science called into question many of the ancient and medieval assumptions. In
response, twentieth-century theological anthropology was an attempt to retrieve the validity of the
faith experience by adopting the modem starting point of the human subject. Catholic
philosophical thought also contributed to the new understanding of the human person. E.g. Karol
Wojtyla, The Acting Person 134-135 (Andrzej Potocki trans., D. Reidel Publg. Co. 1979)
(elucidating the "specifically human" from a phenomenological perspective); Bernard J.F.
Lonergan, Method In Theology 13-20 (Seabury Press 1979) (describing a "transcendental method"
as a basic pattern of human consciousness and knowing); and Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at
914 ("Man, though made of body and soul, is a unity.").
16. Finnis, supra n. 8, at 177-180 (discussing the root of human dignity as the dynamic unity
of body and soul in the human being). Theological anthropology endeavors to avoid the pitfalls of
determinism, empiricism and idealism. Biological, social and economic determinists afford an
abbreviated understanding of human freedom. In the tradition of Descartes, empiricist or
analytical philosophers draw a sharp distinction between body (external world) and cognition
(interior world). In contrast, idealists adopt the Kantian approach of abstract categories. From the
perspective of Catholic thought, these various approaches fail to express the full possibilities for
the human person. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at vii (stating that the author's approach runs contrary to
the trends of modem philosophy since Descartes).
17. St. Thomas distinguished between the intellect and will as the powers of cognition and
appetite in the human soul. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I, 77, 1 & 5. In comparison, Duns
Scotus thought the distinction not to be real but only formal. Scotus apparently wanted to avoid a
faculty psychology. Richard Cross, Duns Scotus 83-84 (Oxford U. Press 1999). Consistent with
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The intellect has the capacity for consciousness of sensation,
understanding, imagination, reflection and judgment.18 The faculty of
the will enables one as a person to constitute oneself through intentional
action.' 9  The interrelatedness of the faculties facilitates self-
possession.20 The self-possessed person fulfills the requirement of
interiority that one know oneself. Through self-knowledge, the person
discovers a love for the truth. The person exercises the will in response
to the understanding of value gained through the intellect. As one
cannot share what one does not first possess, the self-possessed person is
able to share one's self in solidarity with others. The person transcends
self in order to trust others and something greater than self.21 The three
anthropological elements-intellect, will and transcendence-are
essential constituents of the spiritual dimension of the human being.
Love of the truth and the capacity to trust dispose the human
person to the revelation of divine mystery.22 Theological anthropology
is situated within the context of salvation history.23 The Biblical story
commences with the goodness of the creation and the dignity of the
the Scotistic caution, the ideas of intellect and will are considered here as traditional analytical
categories, and obviously not intended as exhaustive descriptions of humanness. Rahner, supra n.
14, at 32 (discussing the horizon for the human person as spirit and flesh); and Gilson, supra n.
15, at 207-248 (describing the human faculties of intellect and will as moving the person toward
beatitude, the supreme good and transcendental last end).
18. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 53 ("Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects
being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be
reasonable, Be responsible.").
19. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 134-135 (describing the act of the will as the person's response to
the appeal of values).
20. In Thomistic thought, the will is in reason (voluntas est in ratione). Frederick C.
Copleston, Aquinas 212 (Penguin Books 1955) (In Thomistic thought, a nature, such as "human
nature," is a way of being which does not possess its state of accomplishment instantly but is
designed to reach it through progression.).
21. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 104 ("Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence."). A
distinction may be drawn between individualism and personalism; and Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at
264-267, 272-273 (describing the distinction between individualism and personalism). According
to Wojtyla, "[i]ndividualism sees in the individual the supreme and fundamental good .... " Id.
at 273. While individualism denotes that the human person acts primarily to advance self-interest,
personalism refers to the constitution of the human person through acting in solidarity with others.
Personalism posits the human person as created not for self-interest but for self-transcendence.
See generally Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism xv-xxviii (Philip Mairet trans., Routledge & Paul
1952) (describing the origins and characteristics of modern personalist thought).
22. Von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 155-176 (discussing the significance of salvation history
for theological anthropology).
23. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 903, 913-914, 917-918 & 922-924 (delineating the
Biblical context of theological anthropology); and Luigi M. Rulla, Franco Imoda, & Joyce Ridick,
Anthropology of the Christian Vocation: Conciliar and Postconciliar Aspects, in Vatican II:
Assesment and Perspectives Twenty-Five Years After (1962-1987) vol. 2, 402 (Ren6 Latourelle
ed., Paulist Press 1988) (summarizing the Biblical anthropology present in the Vatican II
document Gaudium et Spes).
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human person made in the image and likeness of God. 4 It next
describes the fallen state of creation and the lapsarian situation in which
humanity finds itself. 25 The narrative depicts an inner dialectic between
the ideal self of the supra-lapsarian human being and the actual self of
the fractured person who aspires to be whole.26 The dialectic between
the aspirational and actual finds resolution in the Incarnation through
which the divine and human are integrated." Finally, the
incompleteness of the present situation anticipates the consummation of
history. Ultimate fulfillment can be discovered in nothing less than self-
transcendence through openness to the omniscient, omnipotent,
immutable and all-loving divine being. 8
The fresh anthropological perspective was also stimulated by
concerns about some of the major political and economic realities of the
twentieth century.29 While the century witnessed enormous advances in
24. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 913-914 (recalling the Biblical doctrine that the human
person is created in the image of God); and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dignity of the Human Person,
in 5 Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II 121-122 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., Herder &
Herder 1969) (The doctrine of humanity in God's image is not only a doctrine of creation but must
be understood in light of Christology.).
25. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 914; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Christian State of Life
91-92, n. 21 (Mary Frances McCarthy trans., Ignatius Press 1983) (contrary to the Aristoletelian
approach of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure correctly considers the natural goodness of the
original state of humanity that subsequently takes on lapsed nature); and Karl Rahner, The
Theological Concept of Concupiscentia, in Theological Investigations vol. 1, 347 (Cornelius Ernst
trans., Helicon Press 1974) (in theological meaning, the technical term "concupiscence" refers to
the fact that the human person, after the Fall, no longer possesses a perfect control of the drives
and emotions).
26. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 914 (describing the human person as divided between a
"high calling" and "deep misery" as a result of original sin); and von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 43-
72 (discussing the inherent conflict and perfectibility of the human person).
27. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 922-924 (teaching that Christ is the "new man"); and
Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I, 95 (This human nature was understood as created to be
good, then deformed by original sin, and redeemed by Christ who took on human nature and so
perfected it.). The Franciscan school posited that even without the original sin, the Word would
still have become Incarnate, not to redeem, but to perfect humanity. Edward Schillebeeckx,
Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God 13-20 (Sheed & Ward 1963) (describing the
integration of the fullness of Christ's humanity and divinity as the source of Redemption); and
Karl Rahner, supra n. 14, at 212-321 (discussing the Incarnation in relation to the humanity and
divinity of Christ).
28. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 938 (placing human action within the context of
eschatology); Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a
Fundamental Theology 171-190 (Mary Frances McCarthy trans., Ignatius Press 1987) (discussing
the importance of one's concept of history for a correct understanding of Catholic eschatology);
and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 351-356 (The philosophy of St. Thomas "continues nature into
supernature," and posits the destiny of the human person, body and soul, as beatitude.).
29. John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 20-26 (1987) in The Encyclicals of John Paul II (.
Michael Miller ed., Our Sunday Visitor 2001) (describing the Marxist and capitalist political
realities of the twentieth century). The personalists and John Paul II are seeking to articulate a
new Catholic metaphysics that integrates the ideas of objective truth and responsible freedom.
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science and technology, it was also marred by war, genocide and the
devaluation of human life.3" In response, twentieth-century Catholic
thought called for social and legal structures that set the optimal
condition for human development.3 On the one hand, Catholic social
theory steadfastly opposed Marxist regimes in which state collectivism
obscures the dignity and rights of the individual human person.32 At the
same time, the theory has been critical of the capitalist market
economies, which can function in the absence of moral values contrary
to the common good.33 From the perspective of Catholic personalism,
both sets of circumstances result in the alienation and isolation of the
individual person.34
B. Law and the Human Person
Posing the anthropological question in relation to law draws
attention to a quite fundamental, if somewhat overlooked, issue at the
core of legal theory.3 5  The relationship between a society's
understanding of what it means to be human and law is a complex one,
not easily susceptible to analysis.36 Every system of law reflects the
This effort is in response to the twentieth-century pattern of ideological institutions imposing their
own metaphysics upon society. The racism and genocide of Nazi and Marxist ideologies were
products of skewed metaphysical understandings. A critique can be made of the liberal
democracies and market economies when radically autonomous individuals are encouraged to
adopt an unlimited consumerist mentality in the face of the starvation and poverty of the nations
of the Third World. Richard C. Bayer, Capitalism and Christianity: The Possibility of Christian
Personalism 37-68 (Georgetown U. Press 1999) (suggesting a "Christian Personalist" perspective
in response to the failures of the market economy).
30. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, in The Encyclicals of John Paul II (J. Michael Miller ed.,
Our Sunday Visitor 2001) (reviewing the world conditions of the twentieth century and the
response of papal social teaching).
31. John Paul II, supra n. 29, at 5-10 (discussing the originality of twentieth century papal
social teaching); and John Paul H, supra n. 30, at 4-11.
32. John Paul II, supra n. 29, at 20-21 (faulting Marxist government and economy); and John
Paul II, supra n. 30, at 26-27 (discussing the fall of Marxist regimes in 1989).
33. John Paul II, supra n. 29, at 28 (criticizing the capitalist society of "consumption" and
"consumerism"); and John Paul II, supra n. 30, at 31-35 (linking the validity of private property to
a just distribution of goods).
34. Bayer, supra n. 29, at xv (suggesting that the response to "statism is not further emphasis
on the isolated individual, but an expanded understanding of the human person which accounts for
human agency in the context of our varied social communities.").
35. This article is intended neither as a complete account of theological anthropology nor as
the resolution of the array of philosophical problems raised by the relationship between
anthropology and legal language. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 4 (The issues raised by the relationship
include, inter alia, the validity of natural law, free will and determinism, particular and universal,
contingent and transcendent, and the destiny of the human person.). Rather, the article sketches in
broad strokes the unity of theological anthropology and canon law.
36. John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of
the Constitution, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 847, 856-857 (1984) (suggesting that diverse understandings "of
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deeper assumptions about the human being of the society that it
regulates.37 At the same time, the law of a given society shapes the
development of the deeper societal assumptions.3
Law based upon liberal political theory, for example, interacts with
certain anthropological assumptions. First, mainstream legal theory
places a premium on the values of fairness, equality and neutrality in
affording access to the economic and social institutions of society.39
Second, it also emphasizes the protection of individual autonomy to
pursue licit private ends through subjective legal rights.4° Third, its
human nature, human destiny and the meaning of life" are critical to understand constitutional
law); and Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: American Failures.
European Challenges 9 (Harv. U. Press 1987) (a society's law tells a deeper story about the
meaning of the human person).
37. Kevin M. Crotty, Law's Interior: Legal and Literary Constructions of the Self2 (Comell
U. Press 2001) (the concept of "self' is law's interior); and Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self,"
The Making of the Modern Identity 495-521 (Harv. U. Press 1989) (modem identity shapes our
view of individual rights and public institutions).
38. Ronald William Dworkin, The Rise of the Imperial Self." America's Culture Wars in
Augustinian Perspective 78-79 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1996) (suggesting that laws
in democracy have fostered the self-understanding of the "expressive individualist" characterized
by diversity and autonomy).
39. On the notions of equality, see e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 511 (Belknap Press
of Harv. U. Press 1971) (describing equality "as it applies to the respect which is owed to person
irrespective of their social position"); and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (Harv. U.
Press 1977) ("We might say that individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the
design and administration of the political institutions that govern them."). Concerning the rules
that translate the political values, see Rawls, supra n. 39, at 274-284 (Some government regulation
is necessary to maintain a just distribution of resources in society so that all individuals are
permitted to compete as equals in the economic sphere.); and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State. and
Utopia 213-231 (Basic Books 1974) (certain inequalities such as intelligence and ability are
innate, and the good society requires a minimum of government regulation). The separation of
politics from law is an essential element of law based on liberal theory. For a radical critique of
this doctrine, see Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1153-
1155 (1985) (arguing that the legal process cannot be neutral as it is impossible to separate it from
politics). Cf. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics 63 (Free Press 1975) (stating
that liberal theory's claim of neutrality gives rise to a fatal contradiction as it renders it unable to
arrive at "a coherent understanding of the relations between rules and values in social life").
40. The classical liberal theory was fashioned in the thought of certain eighteenth-century
philosophers. See e.g. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of
Civil Government 248, 330-333 (Peter Laslett ed. 1988) (stating that the value of the state resides
in large part in preserving the freedom of the autonomous individual to pursue licit private ends,
and to afford a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes); and John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in
Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government 95-96 (repr. in Selected Writings of John
Stuart Mill (Maurice Cowling ed, 1968)) ("[tjhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others"). For more modem explanations of autonomy and freedom in liberal theory, see Philip
Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 18-31 (Oxford U. Press 1997)
(discussing "republican liberty," which means "freedom from domination"); and Stephen Holmes,
Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 28-30 (U. Chi. Press 1995)
(comparing liberal theory's "negative liberty" of freedom from government interference and
"positive liberty" of the individual's right of political participation and suggesting the borders
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language is secular in the context of a pluralistic society.4' Significant
benefits accrue to individuals and society as a result of the interaction
between law and the assumptions of liberal theory.4 2
Given liberal theory's secular character, the CIC-1983 may at first
glance seem a somewhat awkward and even irrelevant comparative
partner. However, it is precisely the theological character of canon law
that renders it a counter language in the comparative study.43 The
purpose of the counter language is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Descriptively, it sharpens the anthropological horizons of each of the
systems of law. On the basis of the unity of law and theology, the
counter language also offers a critique. The purpose is not to suggest
that mainstream legal theory and its obvious benefits ought to be
abrogated in favor of religious law. Rather, the comparison with canon
law recalls an account of the human good that may have become obscure
in the project of mainstream legal theory.44  The anthropological
assumptions that underpin mainstream legal theory tend to neglect the
spiritual dimension of human existence.45
In discussing the unity of law and anthropology in the CIC-1983,
this article has three sections. The article first considers the relation
between negative and positive conceptions of liberty are often unclear). For a statement of the
role of the judiciary and individual rights, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1202 (1982) (Consistent with traditional
liberal theory, the courts function to curtail government intrusions into the realm of individual
autonomy through a set of fundamental constitutional rights.).
41. This process of secularization is evident in the application of liberal political theory from
the origins of the United States constitutional government. It was stated plainly by the United
States Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State."'). But see Michael W. McConnell, The Origin and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1430-1449
(1990) (tracing the secular and religious reasoning behind the adoption of the religion clauses in
the first amendment).
42. Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity?, in A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's
Marianist Award Lecture 25-37 (James L. Heft ed., Oxford U. Press 1999) (suggesting that the
secular critique of Christianity has resulted in a humanism which has ironically advanced basic
Christian values, but that this humanism is now itself threatened as a result of the loss of the
transcendent).
43. E.g. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 783-784
(1997) (explaining his "proviso," which is an injunction to present only "proper political reasons"
as opposed to comprehensive religious doctrines into public discourse).
44. As the Western legal tradition owes a debt to the medieval canon law, the exclusion of
theological language constitutes a dislocation from history. Berman, supra n. 5, at 520-527
(concluding that the revolution in papal authority and canon law starting in the third quarter of the
eleventh century formed the basis of the modem Western legal tradition).
45. This is not to suggest that in a more comprehensive comparative study, canon law would
not profit from the reciprocity of liberal theory's counter language. The purpose of this article is
limited to the exploration of the unity of canon law and theological anthropology and, therefore, to
its function as a counter language.
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between the CIC-1983 and the intellect. It describes canon law's
internal ratio (organizing principles), suggesting that canon law is
endowed with an objectivity rooted in theological anthropology. The
next section explores the understanding of free will in the CIC-1983. It
indicates that the CIC-1983 contains an understanding of free will, not
based merely upon individual autonomy, but also upon individual
fulfillment through participation with others. In discussing the relation
between the CIC-1983 and the anthropological elements of intellect and
will, the article discloses the law's purpose to foster transcendence. The
final section of the article employs the counter language to raise a series
of questions about the mainstream approach to law. While the critique
of liberal theory is not new, perhaps the anthropology that underpins
canon law may offer some modest comparative insight.
II. INTELLECT: REASON AND FAITH
In his encyclical Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II observed that the
spiritual dimension of human existence calls for the correct balance in
the intellect between reason and faith.46 The equilibrium between reason
and faith sets the conditions in which the intellect's love for truth
prospers.4 On the one hand, the balance is disturbed by an excessive
rationalism.4' Due to skepticism concerning the horizons of human
knowing, rationalism denies the possibility of the apprehension of
supernatural truth in the intellect. It consequently displays a tendency to
46. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, in The Encyclicals of John Paul!I(J. Michael Miller ed., Our
Sunday Visitor 2001) (urging the unity of reason and faith); and Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 103
("The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon. Man's transcendental subjectivity is
mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible. There lies within his
horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored.").
47. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 105 ("As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning,
so being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality.").
48. From a philosophical perspective, "reason" enjoys a long development in the history of
ideas. When he speaks of reason in the encyclical, Pope John Paul II means to reinvigorate the
idea from its roots in Greek and Roman antiquity as it was later developed by the medieval
thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure to its modem expression in the thought of
personalist philosophers such as Gilson and Maritain. All of these thinkers posited the objectivity
of the truth as it is perceived in the mind of the reasonable and knowing subject. The rich
historical development of the concept also includes the influence of Cartesian and Kantian
approaches which tend to emphasize pure reason as a disembodied idea. More modem
approaches as those of Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger argue for the incompleteness of these
cognitive models on the basis of the linguistic, psychological and sociological complexity of
reason. During the twentieth century, Fr. Copleston described the historical narrative of the
development of the idea of reason through the ages and produced a multi-volume magnum opus,
which detailed these various approaches. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece
and Rome vol. 1, 4-8 (Image Books 1993) (discussing the history of philosophy as the perennial
search for truth).
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underestimate the legitimate role played by faith as a way of human
knowing in the quest for truth. Certain forms of existentialism,
historical relativism and absolute evolutionism exhibit this tendency.4 9
On the other hand, fideism also skews the balance. Fideism devalues the
role played by natural reason in the pursuit of truth.5° It fails to
recognize the critical role played by reason in developing a proper
apprehension of divine mystery. This dis-equilibrium can be detected in
Biblical and doctrinal fundamentalism.5' In the face of these tendencies,
the Pontiff has maintained optimism about a partnership between reason
and faith.
52
Pope John Paul's academic background in phenomenology remains
an interpretative key for understanding his optimism.53
Phenomenological analysis describes the human person as "being in the
49. John Paul It supra n. 46, at 54 ("Pope Pius XI1 warned against mistaken interpretations
linked to evolutionism, existentialism and historicism.").
50. James Tunstead Burtchaell, The Dying of the Light: The Disengagement of Colleges and
Universities from Their Christian Churches 828-850 (W.B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 1998) (in the
historical development of American higher education, the emphasis on faith as a private religious
experience rendered it immune from rational analysis and diminished its role in both Protestant
and Catholic colleges).
51. John Paul II, supra n. 46, at 55:
One currently widespread symptom of this fideistic tendency is a 'biblicism' which tends
to make the reading and exegesis of Sacred Scripture the sole criterion of truth ....
Other modes of latent fideism appear in the scant consideration accorded to speculative
theology and in disdain for the classical philosophy from which the terms of both the
understanding of faith and the actual formulation of dogma have been drawn.
52. Id. at 32 (Describing faith and reason as the wings of an eagle, John Paul stated: "[W]hat
is sought is the truth of the person-what the person is and what the person reveals from deep
within.").
53. Husserl was the leading proponent of phenomenology, and there were many subsequent
developments of his thought. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy 145 (David
Carr trans., Nw. U. Press 1970) (describing intentionality as essentially hermeneutical since it is
connected with understanding human experience); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 188-195
(John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., SCM Press 1962) (discussing intentionality's
function in the interpretation of textual and other symbolic materiality); and M. Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception viii-ix (Colin Smith trans., Humanities Press 1962) (suggesting that
science is a "second order" hermeneutical expression of the basic experience of the world).
Wojtyla's habilitation thesis at Lublin University focused on Max Scheler's philosophy as a
phenomenological basis for a retrieved Christian ethics. This was an attempt to integrate the
objectivity of Thomism with the emphasis on human experience in modern thought. Although he
ultimately rejects phenomenology as an inadequate explanation of the objectivity of reality,
Wojtyla argued that phenomenology represents a method for probing human experience. He was
especially interested in the role played by emotions in support of moral action. Robert F.
Harvanek, The Philosophical Foundations of the Thought of Pope John Paul II, in The Thought of
Pope John Paul II: A Collection of Essays and Studies 1 (John M. McDermott ed., Editrice
Pontificia Universiti Gregoriana 1993) (describing the Thomist and phenomenological
philosophical strains in the thought of John Paul II).
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world."54 The analysis rejects the Cartesian dualism between mind and
body.5 5 According to this critique, the disembodied concept of the
intellect, which is present in the works of political theorists such as
Locke and Hume, is too limited. 6 The phenomenologists maintain that
that the human person is not a disembodied Cartesian spirit but an
embodied subject. 7  Phenomenology also eschews idealist Kantian
approaches, which attempt to explain human reason by positing abstract
categories, types or forms. As with the empiricists' limited notion of the
intellect, idealist abstractions do not adequately explain the basic and
concrete experiences of life.58  Instead, phenomenological analysis
examines the multi-faceted levels of somatic, emotional, intellectual and
moral aspects of human experience.
While careful not to accept a primarily subjective view of the
human person, Wojtyla shared the phenomenologists' rejection of the
mind-body dualism and of an overly cognitive approach to human
knowing. He relied on phenomenological method to analyze the valid
function of the body and emotions in the perception of value. In
approaching the human person as constituted through action, Wojtyla
sought to employ phenomenological method as an affirmation of
54. Heidegger, supra n. 53, at 78-90 (describing the human person as "Being-in-the-world");
Merleau-Ponty, supra n. 53, at 79 (adopting Heidegger's description); and Patrick A. Heelan,
Space Perception and the Philosophy of Science 12 (U. Cal. Press 1988):
[Tihe individual human subject ... [is] identical at all times with a Body that he or she
uses or experiences; that Body is inserted into its experienced setting, a World (for that
subject), within which it is both a noetic subject, and an object through which physical
causality flows freely without interference or pause.
The human person forms a coherent sense of self by objectifying and ordering the contents of the
interior life through the intellect, will and body. Cf Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 8-9 (discussing the
objectification of the self through consciousness and intentionality).
55. Heelan, supra n. 54, at 3-8 (describing the phenomenological critique of the Cartesian
dualism); and Andy Clark, Being There, Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again 33 (MIT
Press 1997) (observing that the mind involves a complex interaction of brain, body and world to
form the most ingrained elements of intellectual self-image).
56. Heelan, supra n. 54, at 3 (rejecting as too limited the epistemological approach of Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, E. Mach, J.S. Mill and B. Russell in which to perceive is to be in a pictorial
representation that matches physical reality). The interior life of the human person involves a
complex array of conscious and unconscious sensations, drives, feelings, perceptions, thoughts,
memories and meanings; and Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 9 (describing the empirical, intellectual,
rational and responsible levels of consciousness).
57. The human person as "being-in-the-world" both intentionally acts as a causal agent and is
acted upon by the perceived object. Wojtyla locates the full expression of the human person in the
intentional and specifically the moral act. His central thesis is that as a human person one
constitutes oneself through action. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 149-150 (human fulfillment is
discovered in action).
58. Although he concurs with the phenonmenologists' criticism, Wojtyla placed importance
on Kant's second categorical imperative that one must not use another human person as a means
to an end. Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility 25-34 (H.T. Willetts trans., Ignatius Press
1993) (discussing the meaning and implications of the use of another person).
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Thomist objective morality.59 This methodological approach is evident
in the thought of John Paul II when he describes the human person as
characterized by a love for truth and a capacity to trust. In the Pope's
thought, these human characteristics enable the partnership between
reason and faith. This section examines the relation between the CIC-
1983 and the intellect's capacity for reason and faith as forms of human
knowing.
A. Canon Law and Practical Reason
The phenomenologists' critique of the mind-body dualism and
idealist abstraction is consistent with the anthropological foundation of
the natural law tradition.6° St. Thomas Aquinas defined law as an
"ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care
of the community, and promulgated., 61  Law must be first and foremost
an "ordinance of reason" that flows from the human intellect.62 Practical
reason identifies and applies reasons for choice.63  It would be
incomplete to describe practical reason as a merely cognitive and
abstract mental function of the intellect. Rather, practical reason relies
on the harmony of the somatic, emotional and higher cognitive
functions.' The process of practical reason might be compared to a
59. John J. Conley, The Philosophical Foundations of the Thought of John Paul II: A
Response, in The Thought of Pope John Paul II: A Collection of Essays and Studies 23, 27-28
(John M. McDermott ed., Editrice Pontificia Universiti Gregoriana 1993) (stating that in his
insistence that certain acts are intrinsically wrong, the Pope's explanation uses phenomenological
analysis to support neo-scholastic positions).
60. Ratzinger, supra n. 28, at 87 (discussing the anthropological foundation of tradition).
61. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-1I, 90, 4 ("quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum
commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata").
62. Id. at I, 79, 8 ("[lt is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.").
63. St. Thomas drew a specific distinction between the practical and speculative intellects.
Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I, 79, 11 ("The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers .... For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends ...;
while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends ... to operation."); and John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 101 (Clarendon Press 1986) (describing "practical
reasonableness"). It is the practical intellect that grasps the first principles of natural law or
practical reason. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I, 91, 2 ("It is therefore evident that the
natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law."); and
Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy 243
(Gerald Malsbary trans., Fordham U. Press 2000):
When we realize that there is a 'plan' (a ratio) that underlies the divine government of
the world, and that this ratio gubernationis is called the eternal law, then we can
understand what it means to say that the natural law is a participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature.
Theological anthropology is essentially an endeavor in speculative reason but drawing upon a
practical stamp in the eternal law.
64. Orsy, supra n. 9, at 176-177 (discussing the Thomistic definition of law as meaning an
ordinance of practical right reason). The intellect functions to yield "right reason." This is a
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
maestro who conducts a great symphony orchestra. The maestro invests
his entire self, communicating with the various members and sections of
the orchestra through his hands, face and body language to create the
complex language of a unified and coherent piece of music. In the
identification and choice of natural goods, practical reason requires a
similar investment of the body and soul. The anthropological argument
for natural law encompasses the whole person who is conscious of self,
others and tradition.
A quick sketch of the anthropological approach starts with the self
as conscious subject aware that the human body is located in time and
space.65 Breathing, eating, drinking, sitting, standing, crawling, running,
seeing, touching, and sleeping are but a few of a long list of sensate
experiences known in the intellect as a result of the attributes and limits
of the body. 66  Awareness of the body coincides with the individual
desire for freedom of action. The desire involves a complex interaction
of many levels of conscious and unconscious human experience. The
self's primitive desire for survival and the feelings associated with it
interact with more highly developed feelings, thoughts and values. The
self does not want to be constrained with regard to bodily action.
Self-consciousness coincides with consciousness of others. The
social nature of the human situation leads to awareness of universal
concepts regarding bodily freedom and restriction.67 To illustrate, we
generally do not want another human person to stop us from breathing,
and we realize that we owe a reciprocal duty in this regard. The
movement from want to morality depends on the recognition of an
intermediate grasp of first practical principles. The common
understanding that two human bodies cannot occupy the same space and
time requires practical principles about human relationships. The
reciprocity of consciousness between the individual and the other is not
Gnostic.6' Even the exercise of intellectual freedoms, such as freedom
general term, which means reason free from bias, self-interest and misdirected emotion. Cf
Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 104 (Clarendon Press 1999) ("Right reason is reason
unfettered by emotional or other impediments to choosing consistently with what reason fully
requires.").
65. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 17 ("[Clonscious and intentional operations exist and anyone
that cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-
reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist.").
66. Umberto Eco, Five Moral Pieces 21 (Alastair McEwen trans., Harcourt 2001) ("I am
convinced that there certainly are notions common to all cultures, and that they all refer to the
position of our body in space."); and Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 9 (A transcendental set of
intellectual functions characterizes the human person as one with the capacity for the conscious
awareness of sensation, thought, understanding, judgment and action.).
67. Eco, supra n. 66, at 21 (discussing "universal concepts regarding constriction").
68. Karl Rahner's theology has been critiqued on the ground that it does not give adequate
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of expression, relies upon in some way or another the activity of the
human body.69
The universal concepts of bodily freedom are rooted in practical
reason. The self knows that to survive and prosper in the social context
certain parameters and rules associated with them must be respected.
Practical reason recognizes fundamental rights and responsibilities
inherent to human nature. 70 This is not simply a recognition based upon
self-interest. In the embodied intellect, practical reason understands the
basic good(s) or truth(s) about self in relation to others. The ensuing
dialog between reason and truth motivates the self to consider the
significance of the common good and to value self-sacrifice. Practical
reason encourages the individual to rise above self and value the
common endeavor. It confirms the natural goodness of the human
person.
The acknowledgement of certain rights and responsibilities
transcends the present moment of individual consciousness. The
operation of memory in the intellect generates a unity that is trans-
temporal and trans-spatial.7' Over the course of time, a common fund of
knowledge accumulates.72 This history, preserved by memory, has an
inseparable connection to tradition. In the intellect, memory generates
custom and tradition, which form the context of human relationships.73
Practical reason depends on tradition for information upon which to
reach choices about life in the concrete historical situation. Tradition is
like the score of music without which the maestro could not lead the
consideration to the role of the human body. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A
Theological Aesthetics vol. 2, 322, n. 302 (John Riches ed., Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh &
Brian McNeil trans., Ignatius Press 1984) (criticizing Rahner's interpretation of Bonaventure's
doctrine of the interior or spiritual senses on the ground that it fails to respect the unity of the
human and the divine, flesh and spirit).
69. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its
Challenge to Western Thought 45-59 (Basic Books 1999) (observing that the linguistic study
demonstrates reason to be dialogical rather than purely literal due to its dependence on metaphors
drawn from the embodied reality of the intellect).
70. Clark, supra n. 55, at 53-82 (observing that all material organisms depend on exchanges
of energy, air, food, seed and waste products with other material organisms so that the boundaries
between organisms are relational in character).
71. Heelan, supra n. 54, at 157-158 (human knowing involves a perception, often prior to
consciousness, that is not independent of human culture and history).
72. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 43 (discussing the progress of human knowledge through
successive generations).
73. Ratzinger, supra n. 28, at 87:
[1]t is as memory that intellect proves itself qua intellect; memory generates tradition;
tradition realizes itself in history; as the already existing context of humanity, history
makes humanity possible-for without the necessarily transtemporal relationship of
person to person, humanity cannot be awakened to itself, cannot express itself.
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orchestra to produce great art.
A critical awareness of historical development enhances the
translation of tradition into law. 4 Tradition contains not only the
foundation of human culture, but is also "contaminated" with aspects of
inhuman alienation. 75  The fashioning of law involves a multifaceted
process in which the present situation interacts with the legal tradition.
If law is to set the optimal conditions for individual and communal
development, it needs to reflect those aspects of tradition that
correspond to its anthropological foundation.76 This calls for the
purification of tradition through practical reason. In the critical process,
the recognition of natural rights and responsibilities remains essential to
maintaining the connection with law's anthropological basis. The
Thomistic definition of law contemplates practical reason based on the
whole of human experience. The definition is consistent with the
anthropological foundation of natural law that consists of the human
person who is in relation to others and possession of a critical awareness
of tradition.
Certain contemporary proponents of the natural law tradition
emphasize that the basic principles of natural law are self-evident.77
74. Gadamer, supra n. 7, at 290-294 (discussing the significance for legal history to the
interpretation and refashioning of law in the present by the jurist).
75. Ratzinger, supra n. 28, at 89 ("Tradition, which is by nature the foundation of man's
humanness, is everywhere mingled with those things that deprive him of his humanity. The basis
of man's humanness-tradition---is contaminated.").
76. Gadamer, supra n. 7, at 249 (discussing tradition as dynamic and open to historical
development).
77. E.g. Germain G. Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the
Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, in 10 Natural L. Forum 168, 192 (1965) ("From
man's point of view, the principles of natural law are neither received from without nor posited by
his own choice; they are naturally and necessarily known, and a knowledge of God is by no means
a condition for forming self-evident principles"); Finnis, supra n. 63, at 85-90 (describing the
basic goods); and George, supra n. 64, at 23 1:
Following Aquinas, proponents of the new classical theory identify a plurality of basic
human goods, including life and health, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation,
excellence in work and play, and various forms of harmony within each person and
among persons (and their communities) and between persons (and their communities)
and any wider reaches of reality.
There remains a debate, among contemporary proponents of natural law theory, about the
extent of the independence of practical reason. The critics object to the approach of Finnis on the
ground that the emphasis on the independence of practical reason seems to betray the Thomistic
synthesis and adopt Kantian de-ontology. E.g. Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural
Law Theory 198 (U. Notre Dame Press 1987) (suggesting that the methodology focused on
practical reason runs the risk of adopting Kant's argument for the autonomy of moral obligation
from metaphysics.). Contra George, supra n. 64, at 45 (observing that "the basic goods are not
extrinsic to the persons by and in whom they are instantiated, but, are, rather, intrinsic aspects of
human well-being and fulfillment"). The consequence of the alleged split between law and
ontology, it is argued, opens the retrieved theory of natural law to the attacks of skeptics who
reject the self-evident quality of the basic human goods. Hittinger, supra at 198 (criticizing
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John Finnis, for example, identifies life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion as self-
evident basic human goods.78 Practical reason functions to derive
intermediate moral principles derived from the basic goods and specific
tertiary norms deduced from the intermediate principles. 79  The
transition from the basic goods to rights occurs in a variety of ways.
Sometimes the basics goods are more or less directly translated into
positive law. 0 Book II of the CIC-1983, contains the so-called lex
ecclesiae fundamentalis. The fundamental law of the Church
enumerates many rights, which can be identified as part of the natural
law.8 ' The rights of the Christian faithful to free speech,82 association
theorists who attempt "to recover natural law theory by way of shortcuts"). Cf Lyold L. Weinreb,
Natural Law and Justice 115 (Harv. U. Press 1987) (arguing that the basic human goods are not
self-evident and instead reflect the personal beliefs of the theorists who identify them). But see
Finnis, supra n. 8, at 29-31, 86-94, 102 (explaining that the basic human goods and first practical
principles are in accord with an "anthropological account of persons as human," but need not
necessarily be deduced from such an account); and John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics 20-23, 25
(Georgetown U. Press 1983).
78. Finnis, supra n. 63, at 85-90. Professor Finnis does not necessarily intend this list with an
exhaustive exclusivity. Life, for example, might be said to be a complex basic good that includes
marriage, procreation and the education of children. Finnis, supra n. 8, at 82, 143-154.
79. George, supra n. 64, at 102 (identifying the three sets of principles of which natural law
consists). For a discussion of the transition from basic goods to rights, see Finnis, supra n. 8, at
103-140.
80. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, the legislator translates the transcendent principles
of natural law into the historically specific rules of positive law through the practical intellect in
two ways. The first way consists in a direct conclusion from premises. Summa Theologica, supra
n. 15, at I-II, 95, 2; Finnis, supra n. 63, at 284-290 (noting that the requirements of practical
reason, as for example the prohibition of killing, are derived from particular fundamental values,
e.g. life, and that law is either directly deduced from principles of practical reason or from
construing determinationes); and George, supra n. 64, at 102-111 (observing that natural law
consists of three sets of principles, first, those concerning basic human goods, second,
intermediate principles directing human choice and action, and third, fully specific moral norms).
Aquinas says the second way in which the legislator translates the transcendent principles of
natural law into positive law involves determinationes. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-Il,
95, 2. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, in The Encyclicals of John Paul I (J. Michael Miller ed.,
Our Sunday Visitor 2001) (affirming the significance of fundamental goods to the moral life).
81. Tierney, supra n. 4, at 69 (describing the natural rights theory present in the thought of
the medieval canonists); and James H. Provost, The Obligations and Rights of All the Christian
Faithful, in The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary 134 (James A. Coriden, Thomas J.
Green & Donald E. Heintschel eds., Paulist Press 1985) (referring to the sixth principle for the
revision of the Code that called for the protection of fundamental human rights on the basis of
natural law).
82. CIC-1983, Canon 212 § 3:
They have the right, indeed at times the duty, in keeping with their knowledge,
competence and position, to manifest to the sacred Pastors their views on matters which
concern the good of the Church. They have the right also to make their views known to
others of Christ's faithful, but in doing so they must always respect the integrity of faith
and morals, show due reverence to the Pastors and take into account both the common
good and the dignity of individuals.
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and assembly, 3 education of children, 4 expression of research, 5 and
fundamental due process8 6 are all rights inherent to the dignity of each
human being. Their validity transcends the mere statute to claim a basis
in the transcendent principle of natural law that recognizes human
dignity.1
7
The expressed inclusion of the particular list in the CIC-1983
exemplifies the direct translation of the transcendent basic goods in
response to historical development. A formal list of rights was not part
of the 1917 Code of Canon Law [hereinafter CIC-1917].s8 The new
feature represented a response to the historical development of rights
language starting with the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution and culminating in the United Nation's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 9 In light of the historical development of
rights language, the Preparatory Commission for the CIC-1983
recognized the need to incorporate into the revised statute an expression
of fundamental human rights.90
Practical reason also enables the embodied intellect to derive
intermediate principles and tertiary norms from the first principles that
83. CIC-1983, Canon 215 ("Christ's faithful may freely establish and direct associations
which serve charitable or pious purposes or which foster the christian vocation in the world, and
they may hold meetings to pursue these purposes by common effort.").
84. CIC-1983, Canons 217:
Since Christ's faithful are called by baptism to lead a life in harmony with the gospel
teaching, they have the right to a christian education, which genuinely teaches them to
strive for the maturity of the human person and at the same time to know and live the
mystery of salvation.
226 § 2 ("Because they gave life to their children, parents have the most serious obligation and the
right to educate them. It is therefore primarily the responsibility of christian parents to ensure the
christian education of their children in accordance with the teaching of the Church.").
85. CIC-1983, Canon 218 ("Those who are engaged in fields of sacred study have a just
freedom to research matters in which they are expert and to express themselves prudently
concerning them, with due submission to the magisterium of the Church.").
86. CIC-1983, Canon 221 § 1 ("Christ's faithful may lawfully vindicate and defend the rights
they enjoy in the Church, before the competent ecclesiastical forum in accordance with the law.").
87. Finnis, supra n. 8, at 176-180 (discussing the natural basis of individual human dignity);
and Tierney, supra n. 4, at 55-77 (suggesting that the concept of an individual right is already
present in the work of the medieval canonists).
88. Codex iuris canonici Pii X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus, Benedicti Papae XV
auctoritatepromulgatus (Die 27 m. Maius a. 1917), in 9 AAS II, xix-xxxviii (1917). This Code
was in effect from 1918 until 1983.
89. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 173 (Random House 2001) (observing the Universal Declaration
"harvested the wisdom" of the various rights documents). This is not to suggest that that the idea
of human rights was somehow extrinsic to prior Catholic theology and law. Finnis, supra n. 8, at
136 ("Though he never uses a term translatable as 'human rights,' Aquinas clearly has the
concept.").
90. Provost, supra n. 81, at 134-136 (describing the development of the list of fundamental
rights or lex ecclesiaefundamentalis in the various drafts leading to the CIC-1983).
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direct us towards intelligible fundamental goods.9' Procreation, for
example, constitutes an aspect of the natural good of marriage.
Reflection upon this fundamental good leads to the intermediate
principle that parents are the primary educators of their children. 92
Various canons of the CIC-1983 express the tertiary norms derived
through practical reason from the intermediate principle. 93 Canons 796-
806 specify the freedom of parents in selecting and establishing schools,
as well as the obligation of the state to assist them in this matter.94 A
series of canons concerning the Sacraments emphasize the role of the
parents as the primary religious formators of their children.95 Several
canons pertain to the role of parents in representing minor children in
ecclesiastical courts.96 Another set of canons safeguards the right of
91. As the second way or determinationes demands more creativity than the first, Aquinas
draws an analogy to the "craftsman," who sets-out to build a house. Summa Theologica, supra n.
15, at I-II, 95, 2; George, supra n. 64, at 108-109 (translating the Latin word artifex as
"architect"); and id. at 102 (suggesting that natural law consists of three sets of principles: basic
human goods, intermediate principles and specific moral norms, all of which depend on practical
reason). Consistent with the Thomistic metaphor, the legislator is like the craftsman who
understands the general form of house and must implement it in a practical specification. Id. at
109 ("[The legislator (including the judge to the extent that the judge in the jurisdiction in
question exercises a measure of law-creating power) makes the natural law effective for his
community by deriving the positive law from the natural law.").
92. Finnis, supra n. 63, at 86-87 (describing procreation and education as included in the
category).
93. CIC-1983, Canon 793 (parents have the right and obligation to educate their children, and
Catholic parents have the duty and right to select the institutional means by which Catholic
education can be imparted); and Provost, supra n. 81, at 162-163 ("[T]here is a veritable bill of
parental rights and obligations scattered throughout the revised Code.").
94. CIC-1983, Canon 796 (parents should value schools and parents, and teachers should
have a cooperative relationship with regard to children's education); Canon 797 (parents must
enjoy "real freedom in their choice of schools"); Canon 798 (parents should entrust their children
to schools that afford Catholic education, and when this is not possible, parents must provide the
Catholic education outside the school); Canon 799 (the laws of society should provide for
religious and moral education in schools in accord with the conscience of the parents); Canon 800
(the Church has the right to establish and administrate schools); Canon 801 (religious
communities play a special role in sponsoring Catholic schools and religious education); Canon
802 (the diocesan bishop is responsible to establish schools in which Christian education occurs,
including professional, technical and special education schools); Canon 803 (Catholic schools are
sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority and responsible to teach Catholic doctrine); Canon 804
(Catholic religious formation and its media are subject to the authority of the Church); Canon 805
(the diocesan bishop has the authority to appoint and remove religion teachers in Catholic
schools); and Canon 806 (the diocesan bishop has the "right to watch over and inspect" Catholic
schools in his jurisdiction).
95. CIC-1983, Canons 851, 20, 855, 857, 867-868, 874 (Baptism); Canon 890 (Confirmation);
Canon 914 (Eucharist); Canons 1063, 1071 § 1, 6* (Marriage); and Canon 835 § 4 (in general,
parents share in the sanctifying mission of the Church by providing Catholic formation).
96. CIC-1983, Canon 1478 (§ 1 provides that parents represent their children before an
ecclesiastical tribunal, § 2 allows for the appointment of a guardian in cases when the rights of a
child conflict with those of the parents, and § 3 permits the direct testimony of minors in certain
situations); and Canon 1548 § 2, 2* (recognizing testimony privilege based on consanguinity and
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parents to form associations to enhance their educational efforts and
more generally to promote family life.97 These canonical provisions
exemplify the creativity by which practical reason is used to enact
specific statutory provisions that protect family life and the rights of
parents in regard to children.98 They represent responses to the concrete
historical situations in which the omni-competent state threatens to
usurp the fundamental role of parents.99 Derived from practical reason,
they attest to the anthropological foundation of natural law that
underpins the CIC-1983.
B. The Theological Context of Fundamental Rights
The inner meaning of canon law recognizes that the capacity for
human knowing extends beyond pure rationality. Reliance on scientific
method carries with it a necessary skepticism about the hypothesis to be
verified. The healthy skepticism, however, would defeat the very
purpose of the method if it limited the parameters of evidence to that
which is acquired by way of personal verification.' ° The explosion in
specialized technological information requires that the investigator
accept truths accumulated by other persons 0 l Without this kind of
trust, the resulting pervasive skepticism would only serve to inhibit the
advance of understanding, knowledge and insight. Belief and trust are
affinity).
97. CIC-1983, and Canon 796 § 2 (in cooperating with teachers in the education of children,
parents may form associations); and Canons 298-299 (concerning the right of Christian faithful in
general to form associations).
98. George, supra n. 64, at 108 (suggesting that "in making determinationes, the legislator
enjoys a kind of creative freedom").
99. During the twentieth century, the dominant role of the state in the education of children
was typical of both the liberal democracies and communist states. It stood in contrast to the
Catholic position. Provost, supra n. 81, at 162:
In its struggle with civil authorities who wish to take over schools and monopolize the
educational enterprise, the Church has insisted that parents are the primary educators of
their children and therefore have the primary right and duty to determine how that
education will be carried out.
John J. Coughlin, Common Sense in Formation for the Common Good-Justice White s Dissents
in the Parochial School Aid Cases: Patron of Lost Causes or Precursor of Good News, 66 St.
John's L. Rev. 261, 282-289 (1992) (discussing the constitutional recognition of the natural-law
right).
100. Additional factors, such as creativity, intuition, serendipity and conclusions based on
limited samples and statistical probability, are examples of mental process often employed in
science that go beyond pure reason. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 52-
65 (3d ed., U. Chi. Press 1996) (discussing the emergence of scientific discoveries).
101. John Paul IL supra n. 46, at 32 ("[B]elief is often humanly richer than mere evidence,
because it involves an interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity
to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to others .... ").
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necessary even to scientific method.10 2
Recognition of the healthy limits of skepticism suggests that the
intellect has a natural capacity to trust in forms of truth greater than the
yield of pure rationality. The knowledge gained about self and others
through the intentionality to maintain human relationships further
exemplifies the capacity of the intellect. Such knowledge depends on
the trust of one person in another.'0 3 The capacity to love another,
whether in marriage or friendship, can only be developed by
surrendering part of oneself to another.0 4 It is that form of human
knowing which is the fruit of intimate and enduring relationship. It
involves a trust that transcends requirements of scientific rationality. In
the absence of such trust, the capacity of the intellect would be severely
limited.
Faith, as a form of knowing, also depends upon trust and self-
surrender. The requirement of interiority is not to lead to a self-centered
introspection, but to self-transcendence. l'0 The search for truth points to
something beyond and greater than the individual.' 6 In the interior life,
it raises the questions of infinity, mystery, communion, the sacred
source of creation, the limit of self and the holy beyond. 0 7 Religious
experience represents a response to these kinds of questions. The
experience points beyond the limits of the self, and suggests that human
quest for transcendence may be satisfied only through openness to
sacred mystery, o'
From a theological perspective, the natural capacity of the intellect
to pose the questions is perfected through the supernatural gift of faith.
The narrative of revelation elicits in the hearer a response of longing for
the transcendental of divine mystery. It is the intentionality of the
102. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 42 ("Science is often contrasted with belief, but the fact of the
matter is that belief plays as large a role in science as in most other areas of human activity.").
103. John Paul II, supra n. 46, at 32 (discussing the love for truth as leading to the
interpersonal trust "to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring").
104. Id. ("Human perfection, then, consists not simply in acquiring an abstract knowledge of
the truth, but in a dynamic relationship of faithful self-giving with others."). Wojtyla, supra n. 58,
at 126 (describing love as the gift of "one's whole self").
105. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-11, 3, 4 ("[T]he essence of happiness consists in an
act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will."); and Gilson,
supra n. 15, at 353 ("The very essence of beatitude, therefore, consists in an act of the intellect;
and it is only the delight which accompanies it that can be considered as an act of the will.").
106. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 36-41 (describing self knowledge and self consciousness).
107. Rahner, supra n. 14, at 44-89 (describing the human person in the presence of absolute
mystery).
108. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I, 1, 6 ("Man must, of necessity, desire all,
whatsoever he desires, for the last end."); and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 352 ("It is actually
impossible that man's last end be the human soul or anything belonging to it .... [M]an's
beatitude is in God alone, who is the first and universal good, the source of all other goods.").
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trusting subject to reveal oneself to, and accept the revelation of, the
personal all loving Being.' °9 Faith is an ultimate response to questioning
raised in the intellect by reason. It is a natural form of human knowing
that is animated by love for the truth. "0 At the same time, faith involves
a surrender of self in response to the revelation of supernatural
mystery.'
The intellect's capacity for reason and faith implies a connection
between the two forms of knowing. Faith seeks understanding through
speculative reason concerning the meaning of revelation and religious
experience." 2  Reason realizes that it depends on faith to comprehend
what transcends its natural limits. This balance between reason and faith
is reflected in the sources of the lex ecclesiaefundamentalis of the CIC-
1983. Canon 211 of the fundamental rights of the Church exemplifies
the balance. The canon recognizes the right and obligation of all the
baptized to spread the gospel." 3 Natural law may be identified as a
source of the fundamental right recognized in the canon. The right
belongs to the broader religious freedom enjoyed by every human being
and not only the baptized."14  In identifying the source of this
fundamental natural right as the "very dignity of the human person,"
Vatican II implicitly recognized practical reason or the anthropological
foundation of rights and duties." 5
109. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 105-106:
Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. All
love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or
qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our
capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper
fulfillment of that capacity.
110. John Paul It supra n. 46, at 16 (describing the human person as the one who loves the
truth).
111. The notion of mystery was confronted by the Enlightenment critique as well as the
progress of science. In response, twentieth-century theological anthropology attempted to retrieve
a concept of mystery that would no longer be discredited. E.g. Rahner, supra n. 14, at 60-61
(suggesting that the term "mystery" needs to "be understood, deepened, and then gradually shown
to be identical with the word "God").
112. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-II, 3, 5 ("Happiness consists in an operation of the
speculative rather than of the practical intellect."); and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 354 ("The most
perfect power of the intellect is the one whose object is the most perfect, that is whose object is
the essence of God. This essence is the object of the speculative not of the practical intellect.").
113. CIC-1983, Canon 211 ("All Christ's faithful have the obligation and the right to strive so
that the divine message of salvation may more and more reach all people of all times and all
places.").
114. Declaration on Religious Liberty: On the Right of the Person and Communities to Social
and Civil Liberty in Religious Matters, "Dignitatis Humanae," in Vatican Council I." The
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents 799, 800-804 (Austin Flannery ed., Liturgical Press
1992).
115. Id.
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Canon law, however, is more than an ordinance of practical
reason. " ' When applied to canon law, the communitas of the Thomistic
definition of law refers to the ecclesiastical community of the Catholic
Church." 7  The lex ecclesiae fundamentalis is incorporated into the
canons at the beginning of Book II of the CIC-1983, under the title "The
People of God." Section 1 of Canon 204 defines the People of God as
those who are members of the Church through the sacrament of
baptism."' This placement situates the fundamental rights and
responsibilities, such as that of Canon 211, within the theological
context of communio.119
Theological reflection on Christian revelation has endowed the
concept of communio with a deep meaning. The baptized members of
the Christian community understand themselves to have a direct
relationship to the Paschal Mystery of Christ. Communio requires that
the individual members and the community itself continually die to the
disorder of selfishness and be transformed into a new creation through
the grace of Christ. 20  Fundamental rights and responsibilities emerge
from the theological reality that the Church, more than a collection of
individuals, is a community formed by Christian faith.
116. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 137 ("The ultimate end of the canonical order is not simply that of
guaranteeing the bonum commune ecclesiae, but of realizing communio."). Orsy, supra n. 9, at 58
("Canon law originates with and remains tightly bound to a hierarchy of values, human and
religious.").
117. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-il, 90, 4, (defining law as an "ordinance of reason
for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.").
118. CIC-1983, Canon 204 § 1:
Christ's faithful are those who, since they are incorporated into Christ through baptism,
are constituted the people of God. For this reason they participate in their own way in
the priestly, prophetic and kingly office of Christ. They are called, each according to his
or her particular condition, to exercise the mission which God entrusted to the Church to
fulfil in the world.
119. Robert J. Kaslyn, Book I1: The People of God, Introduction, in New Commentary on the
Code of Canon Law 241, 242-245 (John P. Beal, James A. Coriden & Thomas J. Green eds.,
Paulist Press 2000) (the fundamental rights or lex ecclesiae fundamentalis are situated in the
theological context of communio); Joseph Ratzinger, Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, Litterae ad
Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopos de aliquibus aspectibus Ecclesiae prout est Communio (Die 28 m.
maii a. 1992), in 85 AAS 838 (1993) (explicating the dogmatic implications of communio). To
mention only a few of theologians and canonists who concur on this point, see Zenon
Grocholewski, Aspetti teologici dell 'attivita giudiziaria della Chiesa, 110 Monitor Ecclesiasticus
489, 492-495 (1985); Hans Urs von Balthasar, In the Fullness of Faith: On the Centrality of the
Distinctively Catholic 67-91 (Graham Harrison trans., Ignatius Press 1988); Angel Anton,
Postconciliar Ecclesiology, Expectations. Results and Prospects for the Future, in Vatican I:
Assessment and Perspectives Twenty-Five Years After (1962-1987) vol. 1, 407, 416420 (Ren&
Latourelle ed., Paulist Press 1988); and David L. Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the
Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation 7-31 (W.B. Eerdmans Publg. Co.
1996).
120. Ghirlanda, supra n. 12, at 3045. (Etymologically, the Latin word communio derives
from the Greek word koinonia, which means a communion, fellowship or sharing in common.).
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Practical reason and theological reflection serve as the sources of
fundamental rights and duties in Book II of the CIC-1983 21 When the
Supreme Legislator placed these natural rights in the faith context of
communio, it only enhanced their claim. An injury to a fundamental
right not only detracts from the natural social order. Theologically, it is
understood as an injury to the injured individual and as damaging the
fabric of communio itself. The law has a symbolic function that
transcends pragmatic rationality to teach the community about natural
and supernatural truths.
A symbol constitutes an indissoluble unity of an outward, external
language and an inner meaning or intellectus.'22 In accord with the
anthropological insight concerning the human intellect's capacity for
truth, this deeper intellectus of canon law involves a synthesis of both
reason and faith.22 The language of canon law manifests an inner
meaning or intellectus, which corresponds to the capacity of the intellect
to know natural and theological truth. 1 4 The symbolic value of canon
law reminds us of the possibility for balance between faith and reason in
the intellect. Eviscerated of its inner meaning, legal language loses its
symbolic function. It is reduced to the dry bones of historical
circumstance absent transcendent value. Without its ground in the truth
about the human person, law runs the risk of denying the full
possibilities of human intellect.
121. Walter Kasper, The Theological Foundations of Human Rights, 50 Jurist 148, 157 (1990)
(discussing the natural law and theological tradition as the foundation for human rights).
122. Gadamer, supra n. 7, at 67-73 (a symbol emerges organically and appeals to aesthetic
consciousness to point beyond itself).
123. Ladislas Orsy, Theology and Canon Law: An Inquiry into their Relationship, 50 Jurist
402 (1990) (summarizing some of the numerous theories about the relationship between canon
law and theology). As illustrative of the theories, see e.g. Klaus Mdrsdorf, Schriften zum
kanonischen Recht (W. Aymans, K.T. Geringer & H. Schmitz eds., 1989) (canon law is a
theological discipline with a juridical method); Corecco, supra n. 2, at 96-107 (canon law should
not be defined so much as ordinatio rationis, but rather as ordinatiofidei); Wilhelm Bertrams, De
relatione inter episcopatum et primatum. Principia philosophica et theologica quibus relatio
iuridica fundatur inter officium episcopale et primatiale (1963) (canon law studies the external
juridic realities of philosophical and theological truths); Eduardo Labandeira, Tratado de Derecho
Administrativo Can6nico 48-49 (1988) (given the sacramental character and special mission of the
Church, canon law, in its existence and authoritative interpretation, remains always subject to
ecclesiastical authority); Pio Ciprotti, Stato attuale e prospettive della giustizia amministrativa
canonica, 98 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 354 (1973) (canon law may be considered as a proper object
of juridical science); and Ghirlanda, supra n. 12, at 15-45 (canon law reflects the mystery of
hierarchical communion in the Church).
124. Von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 162-163 (describing the historical):
longing to move from the letter to the spirit, from the institution and the sacrament to the
intellectus within them ... a growing awareness that the 'peoples' could only take from
the Church (and its mission) its 'form' if they found in the form that intellectus which
would impart to it, beyond its naked factualness, an inner necessity of salvation history.
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C. Transcendental and Historical Method
Theological anthropology maintains that the intellect has the
capacity to comprehend certain truths, which transcend time and
culture.125  This contrasts with the more modem view that no
metaphysical truth about the human person continues throughout
history. 26 The modem doctrine of historicity has led to the conclusion
that law rests not on metaphysical truth but upon the specific temporal
and cultural circumstances in which it is produced.127  In the words of
Hegel, it rejects the truth of the tradition as "a heavenly truth alone, a
Beyond."' 28  Contrary to the Hegelian characterization, theological
anthropology finds in the human person an inner dialectic between the
transcendent and historical that is animated by the love for the truth.
In the twelfth century, Gratian's Decretum was the product of a
dialectical method that set the standard for the future development of
canon law. 129  The modem objection argues that the recognition of
125. Armand Maurer, St. Thomas and Historicity 26 (Marquette U. Press 1979) (noting that St.
Thomas held there is one eternal truth, which is the truth of the divine mind, while later thinkers
such as Duns Scotus, Suarez and Descartes posited the doctrine of eternal truths); and Gilson,
supra n. 15, at 302 (suggesting that with regard to moral truths from which laws are derived "there
are no universals in morals except principles. When it is a question of deciding upon any
voluntary action whatsoever, a whole set of principles becomes necessary plus detailed discussion
of all the circumstances which meet in it."). This is not to deny the existence of the universality of
objective moral norms. Both practical reason and revelation recognize specific and negative
norms. For example, the negative prohibition, "Thou shalt not kill," is part of the Decalogue and a
basic principle available through the natural order of practical reason.
126. Maurer, supra n. 125, at 2 ("Nietzsche opened the way to a revolution of metaphysics by
asserting the death of God and at the same stroke historicizing metaphysical truth."). Prior to
Nietzsche, David Hume had engendered skepticism about the possibilities of moving from the
empirical "is" to the moral "ought." David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 302 (David Fate
Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford U. Press 2001); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study
in Moral Theory 57-59 (2d ed., U. Notre Dame Press 1984) (defending the transition from is to
ought on the ground that the nature and function of the human person are interrelated concepts);
and Gerald V. Bradley, Natural Law, in Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought 277, 282-286
(Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., Yale U. Press 2001)
(discussing the interrelation between practical and speculative reason).
127. Unger, supra n. 39, at 193-194 (observing the general trend of modern social theory to
reflect the view that "the very notion of a unitary human nature dissolves at the touch of history's
magic wand").
128. Maurer, supra n. 125, at 32, citing Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy vol. 3,
52 (E.S. Haldane & Frances H. Simson trans., Routledge & Paul 1898).
129. Concordia discordantium canonum. Decretum Magistri Gratiani, in I Corpus Juris
Canonici, (Aemilius Friedberg ed. 1959); Brundage, supra n. 5, at 47-49 (Gratian's dialectic
became the standard that "demonstrated concretely how abstract legal principles could be applied
to resolve the messy disputes that continually arise between real people in the real world."); and
Berman, supra n. 5, at 602, n. 11 (The Corpus Iuris Canonici was established officially in 1580 by
Pope Gregory XIII, as consisting of the following decretals: (1) Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140); (2)
Pope Gregory IX's Decretales (1234); (3) Pope Boniface VIII's Liber Sextus Decretalium (1298);
(4) Pope Clement V's Clementinae (1305-1314), and those decretals issued by the Council of
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immutable truths precludes a system of law from incorporating new
insights. 30 Yet, Gratian culled scriptural texts, canons of ecumenical
and local councils, decrees of the Popes, rules contained in various
penitentials, the rediscovered Justinian body of Roman law and virtually
any other source that pertained to some aspect of law.' 3' He collected
thirty-eight hundred canonical texts reconciling the contradictions or
indicating those that he found to be irreconcilable, offering
generalizations and sometimes harmonizing the generalizations. 32  The
dialectical methodology endowed canon law with an enduring formula
for the inclusion of both transcendent truths and historical
development.
1 3
Vienne (1314), and transmitted to the universities by Pope John XXII in 1317. In addition,
although not an official part of the text, John XXII's Collectio Viginti Extravagantium and the
Extravagantes Communes (1316-1364) are usually considered to be part of the Corpus Juris
Canonici.).
130. Unger, supra n. 39, at 194 ("The claim that human nature is independent of history has
striking political implications: the limits of man's nature restrict the power of his striving to
transform his experience."); and cf. Maurer, supra n. 125, at 32 (Contrary to the criticism of
Thomistic epistemology as removed from history, St. Thomas advanced an understanding of truth
that integrated the universal and transcendent with the temporal and historic such that it permitted
the possibility for development and new insight in human knowledge.).
131. Gratian built on the collections of earlier decretalists, particularly those of Burchard,
Bishop of Worms (1012) and tvo, Bishop of Chartres (1095). Burchard made one of the earliest
attempts to compile all the laws of the Church into a single book. He arranged his vast collection
not chronologically but according to various subjects such as the Sacraments, crimes, spiritual and
corporal works of mercy, and the contemplation derived from ascetic life. See J.P. Migne,
Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, [hereinafter PL] 140, 539-1058 (1844-1855). Like
Burchard, Ivo compiled a vast collection of laws with commentary in order to unite canon law
"into one body." Id. See Migne, PL 166, 47. An analysis of the canonists and theologians upon
whom Gratian relied is provided in Stanley Chodorow, Christian Political Theory and Church
Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century: The Ecclesiology of Gratian's Decretum 2, n. 3 (U. Cal.
Press 1972).
132. Berman, supra n. 5, at 143-148, 151 (Gratian's method "revolutionized the science of
law."); and John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 114-117 (U. Mich. 1968) ("The primary task
of the jurists as they conceived it was to provide solutions for cases that had arisen or might arise,
testing and revising their central ideas by observing their effects on particular cases." The Roman
jurists had been primarily concerned with "the consistent and orderly treatment of individual cases
. .. [and] [t]heir whole impulse was toward economy, not only in language, but in ideas"); and
Charles Lefebvre, Equity in Canon Law, in Equity in the World's Legal Systems: A Comparative
Study 93 (Ralph A. Newman ed., Etablissements Emile Bruylant 1973) ("Canon law asserted its
superiority over Roman law by reason of the greater attention given by canon law to particular
circumstances, and especially to the Christian concept of the nature of man."). Cf Robert E.
Rodes, Jr., Ecclesiastical Administration in Medieval England: The Anglo-Saxons to the
Reformation 66 (U. Notre Dame Press 1977) (suggesting that even as theology afforded the
"roots" of canon law, the method and substance of the new canon law was appropriated directly or
indirectly from the Roman jurists).
133. Berman, supra n. 5, at 204-205 (Although it manifests transcendent characteristics, canon
law also possesses the characteristic of "organic development." The ability of the medieval
canonists to assimilate both immutable principles and historical circumstance into the corpus of
law became the foundation of the western legal tradition.).
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As an important feature of the methodology, the canonists
distinguished between divine, natural and positive law. According to
Gratian, divine law is the will of God manifested in Revelation,
especially the Sacred Scripture.'34 Natural law also reflects the divine
will, but in distinction to revelation, it can be discerned through the right
use of human reason. 3 Positive law is man-made law, which must
always be in harmony with divine and natural law.3 6 Further, custom
must yield both to natural law and positive law. 3 7 On the basis of these
categories, Gratian distinguished between immutable principles of
eternal validity and elements of law that had been suggested by the
particular circumstances of time, place and persons.s' The immutable
principles give law the force to bind. No mere positive law or human
custom may serve as the source of this inner force.
The methodology of the CIC-1983 rests upon the science of law,
but places it at the service of theology and faith.'3 The process for the
revision of the CIC-1983 required working through an enormous body
of legal tradition and theology, drawing careful distinctions among laws,
precedents and customs, proficiency in reasoning by analogy, and
formulating broad general theories without sacrificing attention to detail.
This method, first honed by the medievals, remains essential to moderncanonists140 It is a dialectical method that reflects some of the most
fruitful skills of the human intellect.' 4' Canonists continue to employ
the method to yield a corpus of law grounded in immutable truth and
open to the possibilities of history.
134. Id. at 144-145 ("Divine law is the will of God reflected in revelation, especially the
revelation of Holy Scripture.").
135. D. 9 c. 1. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 35-38 (By positing the "connaturality" of reason and
faith, St. Thomas "eliminated the possible pantheistic elements concealed in identifying natural
with divine law, as had been done by Isidore of Seville and Gratian.").
136. D. 9c. 1.
137. D. llp. lcc. l-4.
138. D. 9 dicta post c. 9.
139. Ioannes Paulus Pp. II, Sacrae Disciplinae Leges supra n. 1, at 53:
As the Church's fundamental legislative document, and because it is based on the
juridical and legislative heritage of revelation and tradition, the Code must be regarded
as the essential instrument for the preservation of right order, both in individual and
social life and in the Church's zeal.
Corecco, supra n. 2, at 134 ("The 'theologization' and 'sacramentalization' of canon law do not
lead to its 'de-juridization' because the normativity that issues from the Church is an unambiguous
index ofjuridical authenticity.").
140. Helmholz, supra n. 4, at 397:
Whether one looks at their ability in mastering the relevant authorities, their proficiency
in reasoning by analogy, their skill in analyzing precedents, their talent in drawing legal
distinctions, or their energy in working through a large body of law, the canonists seem
scarcely inferior to modem lawyers.
141. Lonergan, supra n. 15, at 128-130 (describing dialectical method).
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D. The Objectivity of Canon Law
There remains the question of the relation between the natural and
supernatural in canon law.' 42 First, canon law accepts the independence
of reason from faith as a way of knowing. Although the fundamental
rights of Book II of the CIC-1983 are ascribed to all the Christian
faithful, these natural rights and responsibilities precede Baptism and
belong to the basic dignity of the individual human person.' 43  The
responsibility of parents as the primary educators of their children, for
example, does not depend on membership in the Church but instead on
the prior natural order.' 44 In accord with Christian anthropology, the
basic rights and responsibilities articulated in the CIC-1983 may be
derived independently from theology on the basis of the natural
goodness of the human person. 41 In this sense, the natural law
constitutes an independent objective moral order based upon practical
reason.
Second, the canonical tradition has long considered natural rights
and responsibilities to inhere in the subject. They are subjective in the
142. Although Gratian placed the natural and divine law at the interior of positive law, he did
not resolve the problem raised by the relation between natural and divine law. Corecco, supra n.
2, at 38 (referring to the Patristic concern that the identification of the natural and divine law
tended to attribute pantheistic elements to the theory of law). St. Thomas clarified the relation by
distinguishing between the natural and supernatural, and positing the "co-naturality" of reason and
faith. Id. ("By making this distinction, St. Thomas preserved both the rationalistic element of
Stoic natural law theory and the religious and sacral one of the Judeo-Christian tradition."). John
Paul II, supra n. 46, at 1 (describing reason and faith as "two wings" requiring the coordinated
action of both to discover the truth).
143. Book II of the CIC-1983, Canon 204, introduces the section on the fundamental rights
with a description of the Christian faithful as those who are incorporated into Christ and the
Church through Baptism.
144. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the natural right. Meyer v.
Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating that parents have a "natural duty" to educate their
children); and Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925):
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply not hinder."); and Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972):
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.
145. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness 51 (Clarendon Press 2001) (discussing human goodness
as sui generis, which gives rise to the understanding of right and wrong and rights and
responsibilities).
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sense that the principles are intrinsic to the human intellect and known
by individual persons.1 46  The objectivity of natural law means that it
stands as an external measure of what is right and just for all persons. It
is known in its basic and derivative principles through the use of
practical reason. At the same time, practical reason is but one capacity
of the faculty of the human intellect. This capacity can never be
separated from the dynamic unity of the human being.1 47  Practical
reason does not function as absolutely independent from the speculative
methodology of Christian anthropology. Rather, it is an essential
element of that anthropology. Natural law is "natural" because it is a
universal anthropological trait. For the same reason, it has an
ontological ground, as an inherent capacity of the human intellect. The
inclusion of the fundamental rights affirms the ontological ground of
natural law and the relationship between law and anthropology.
Third, canonical methodology admits no inherent opposition
between practical reason and faith. 148  The methodology of canon law
depends upon practical reason. At the same time, it is informed by an
understanding of the nature and ends of the human person gained
through faith. The natural realm is seen as complementary to, and
enhanced by, the supernatural. 149  From the perspective of Biblical
anthropology, the goodness of nature disordered by sin needs
redemptive grace in order for the beauty of creation to be fully
illuminated. 50 In personalist thought, the supernatural does not abrogate
the natural, but builds upon it in order to perfect it.'
146. Brundage, supra n. 5, at 155 citing Hugguccio, Summa decretorum, 50 c. 25 v. iubeo.
(The medieval canonists had long held that the natural law formed an objective moral order that
was available through human reason to each individual human being and through which the
human person constituted oneself by acts of the human will. The medieval canonist, Hugguccio
(d. 1210), for example, insisted that the ius naturale constituted both an objective norm and a
subjective faculty of the human soul.).
147. Saint Thomas concluded that through the intellect's use of right reason, and especially so
when enlightened by grace, a set of universal and transcendent moral principles is available to
each human person. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I, 75 (discussing how the natural ability
of the intellect to know any truth and of the will to act for any good is perfected by grace).
148. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 140 ("[A]lthough he defines the law as ordinatio rationis, [St.
Thomas] considers such a definition valid not only for human and natural law, but also for the lex
aeterna and the lex divina.").
149. Id. at 144-145:
If it is possible, in the philosophy of law, to work with a notion of law that is
metaphysically conceived as ordinatio rationis, by applying the analogia entis, then the
proper analogy in theology is that of faith .... The existence of the analogia between
ratio andfides is justified by the fact that, in both cases, a cognitive process is involved.
150. Von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 27-30 (discussing sinful time and the time of grace).
151. In Thomistic thought grace is not in opposition to nature, but grace builds upon nature
and so perfects it. Corecco, supra n. 2, at 37-38 (quoting the Thomistic principle "gratia perficit,
non destruit, naturam").
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The design of the fundamental rights articulated in Book II of the
CIC-1983 reveals the legislator's intent to maintain the connection with
Christian anthropology. The design utilizes natural law principles as the
fundamental building blocks of a section in Book II, which is entitled
"The Rights and Responsibilities of All the Christian Faithful." The
design thus acknowledges the natural goodness of the human person in
respecting the embodied intellect's ability to know natural truth. The
design also respects the possibilities for faith and revelation in the
fullness of the experience of what it means to be human. The law is
anthropological in that it reflects the proper balance between natural and
supernatural truth.
III. WILL: SELF AND TRANSCENDENCE
In the phenomenological analysis of human knowing, the
intellect's capacity to understand the good is complemented by the
faculty of the will. The will affords the person the intentionality to act
in accord with the good. 5 2  Respect for free will requires that the
individual not be confined by authoritarian restrictions. However, the
freedom enjoyed by the will is not simply a negative freedom in that the
person is free from the absence of constraint.'53 Rather, it is a positive
freedom in that it moves the will to act for the good identified by the
intellect. 54
The capacity for human knowing entails willingness to entrust
oneself to a body of knowledge accumulated by others. 55  The
Thomistic definition requires that law be promulgated by one who has
care for the community. 5 6 Given its optimism about the possibilities for
the interior life, Catholic theology has never advocated a radically
autonomous subjectivity. Rather, it has embraced the function of the
proper authority as critical in directing the free choice for the good.
152. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I, 82, 1; and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 236-238
(describing the faculty of the will in Thomistic thought).
153. Gilson, supra n. 15, at 244 (noting the tendency of some "philosophers [to] limit human
liberty to this absence of constraint").
154. Cf Unger, supra n. 39, at 84:
Freedom may be defined positively or negatively in liberal thought. Positively, it is the
power to pursue one's goals without human interference. Negatively, it is the condition
in which one does not have to submit to someone else's will. The positive and the
negative definition[s] are interchangeable, given the qualification attached to the former,
'without human interference.'
155. John Paul It supra n. 46, at 32 (speaking of the human person and the trust in knowledge
acquired by others).
156. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-II, 90, 4, (defining law as an "ordinance of reason
for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated").
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Ecclesiastical law flows from the authority of the magisterium to guide
individuals and communities about the true nature of human freedom.
157
The teaching authority of the Catholic magisterium safeguards the
developing deposit of Catholic wisdom, which contains the objectivity
of truth.'
In contrast, if all truth is ultimately historical, then nothing
transcendent or essential to the human person remains throughout
history.5 9 An image of the person emerges in which the concept of self
is invented through the exercise of the radically autonomous will
according to the subjective preference of the individual. Any
philosophical truth or law based upon it is the product of human self-
invention. 60 The notions of good and evil, the truth about humanity, are
not something fixed and abiding, but are determined by the will of
individuals in specific historical and cultural circumstances.1 6' The basis
of law is not an objective moral order discovered in the interior life, but
the power of individuals to implement and enforce their will upon
others. 162  This section explores the understandings of the human will
and freedom that underpin the CIC-1983.
A. The Will and Self
The focus on humanity's self-making emerged in modem and not
medieval thought. The language of the legal right (ius), however, which
was developed by the medieval canonists, implicitly recognized the
dignity of the individual person. 163  Christian thought had long adopted
157. CIC-1983, Canon 747 (stating that the Church has been entrusted with the "deposit of
faith" and that it must be free to preach and teach the truth of the faith).
158. CIC-1983, Canons 749 §§ I & 2, 750, 752 (defining the role of the College of Bishops
with the Roman Pontiff at its head in the teaching of moral truth).
159. Maurer, supra n. 125, at 3 ("Contrary to the older view of man as possessing a permanent
nature underlying his historical and cultural changes, the more recent philosophy of man refuses
him a fixed and abiding nature. Nothing essential or substantial to man remains throughout his
history.").
160. Id. at 2 (Nietzsche expressed this view when he described truth as "the will to power.").
161. Taylor, supra n. 37, at 453 (describing Nietzsche's view of the self as tied to the need to
"overcome the force of morality and find the strength to rise above its demands").
162. Crotty, supra n. 37, at 157-159 (emphasis omitted) (suggesting that irrational factors
undercut the reasonableness and legitimacy of the law that thinkers such as Habermas and Rawls
ascribe to the "will-formation" that should take place "throughout a free society, in discussions,
reports, debates by and among citizens."); and Unger, supra n. 39, at 85 (arguing that modem
political philosophy conceives of laws that enable the pursuit of private ends as one of the mains
ways to establish freedom).
163. Brian Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J. L. & Relig. 163, 164-
167 (through ascribing an objective and subjective meaning to ius, the medieval canonists
developed a "concept of each human being as a person, entitled to consideration as a person,
capable of moral discernment and self-determination").
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the Jewish doctrine, contained in the Book of Genesis of the Hebrew
Bible, which held that every human being was created in the "image and
likeness" of God.'6 From this starting point, the canonists attributed to
every human person a set of natural rights and obligations that could be
known through the use of "right reason.' ' 5  In medieval law, the
meaning of ius gradually evolved to signify, not an objective entity
alone, but a power, faculty, reason or will inherent in the human
person. 66  The medieval canonists used the word equivocally. Jus
indicated an objective right order, which found expression through a
body of law, and a subjective power, which constituted an aspect of
human personality. 67  The canonists' attention to the language of
fundamental rights and responsibilities, however, was not focused on
individual subjectivity. Recognizing the essentially social nature of the
human being, the canonists discussed ius naturale in the context of
communities and corporate groups. 6 1 The legal theory of the medieval
canonists can only be said to have anticipated the modem notion of will.
Again, the phenomenological analysis of Karol Wojtyla responds
to the modem problem. Retrieving the medieval notion, Wojtyla accepts
that the human person is endowed with a permanent nature or essence.1
69
He also affirms the personalist position that the human person possesses
the capacity for openness to being, even to the mystery of divine
being. 70  At the same time, Wojtyla agrees that the human person
164. Gen 1:26; and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 345-346 (discussing the quality of being in the
image of God).
165. See Brundage, supra n. 5, at 155 citing Hugguccio, Summa decretorum, 50 c. 25 v. iubeo
(Hugguccio insisted that the ius naturale constituted both an objective norm and a subjective
faculty of the human soul.).
166. Tierney, supra n. 4, at 19 (The canonists, for instance, transformed the Roman notion of
action or suit by treating it as a "subjective ius.").
167. Tierney, supra n. 163, at 171 (The canonists defended certain fundamental rights through
the use of natural law concepts. The rights to private property, marriage, procedural safeguards in
litigation, free consent to agreements, and privacy of conscience in the internal forum were among
those natural rights that helped to define the social order of the medieval world. The canonists
drew charters of rights to be exercised by local communities, guilds, colleges, churches and the
emerging city-states.).
168. Tierney, supra n. 163, at 164 (identifying three characteristics of medieval anthropology
and canon law: (1) "the concept of each human being as a person, entitled to consideration as a
person, capable of moral discernment and self-determination"; (2) "the church not just as a
collection of separate individuals but as a corporate community, sustaining a life of its own, apart
from the secular power ..."; and (3) "a ... more subtle yet significant aspect ... the relation
between the individual Christian and the church conceived of as a united whole, a mystical
body").
169. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 77 (discussing the term "nature" in the actual human being as an
ontological reality that points to the essence of human nature).
170. Id. at 184-186 (discussing the unity of the corporeal and spiritual in the human person).
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constitutes one's self through action.17' The act of the will, according to
Wojtyla, has consequences that are not sufficiently explained by a mere
theory of human agency.17 2  Not only does an act of the will direct a
human subject to a value, but through this act in a certain sense: "I
become my own creator."'
73
Wojtyla sees no incompatibility between the traditional notion of a
fixed human nature and the modem conception of self-determination
through free will. 74  Every human person, Wojtyla observes, is a
"someone" from the beginning of life in the metaphysical sense. 75
Every individual, therefore, enjoys an inalienable dignity as a result of
the fact that the individual possesses transcendent human nature.1 76 The
human person does not create him/herself in the metaphysical sense.
177
In his or her specific historical circumstances, the individual,
nonetheless, constitutes him/herself through individual acts of the free
will. 171 One realizes oneself as "more of a somebody" in a distinctly
personal and subjective manner.179 In acquiring intellectual, moral and
aesthetic qualities, one constitutes oneself as a fuller, self-possessed
human being. While the human person's rationality and freedom flow
from an abiding essence, an individual enjoys at the same time the
ability to develop oneself through self-mastery.
180
The Christian tradition holds that the human person is endowed
with free will to choose between good and evil.' Free will depends on
171. Id. at 265 (action has both an ontological and axiomatic significance in that "the person
performing the action ... fulfills himself in it"); and Karol Wojtyla, The Personal Structure of
Self-Determination, in Person and Community: Selected Essays 187, 191 (Theresa Sandok trans.,
Peter Lang 1993) ("Action accompanies becoming").
172. Wojtyla, supra n. 171, at 191:
Self-determination reveals that what takes place in an act of will is not just an active
directing of the subject toward a value. Something more takes place as well: when I am
directed by an act of will toward a particular value, I myself not only determine this
directing, but through it I simultaneously determine myself as well.
173. Id. ("I am also in some sense the 'creator of myself."').
174. Karol Wojtyla, The Human Person and Natural Law, in Person and Community: Selected
Essays 181 (Theresa Sandok trans., Peter Lang 1993) (describing the alleged conflict between
nature law and the human person as illusory).
175. Wojtyla, The Personal Structure of Self-Determination, supra n. 171, at 192 ("in the
ontological sense the human being is a 'someone' from the very beginning").
176. Karol Wojtyla, On the Dignity of the Human Person, in Person and Community: Selected
Essays 177, 179 (Theresa Sandok trans., Peter Lang 1993) (The dignity of the human person is
confirmed in the revelation that we are "created in 'the image and likeness of God."').
177. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 72-74 (discussing the ontological basis of action).
178. Id. at 68 ("man creates himself in acting").
179. Wojtyla, The Personal Structure of Self-Determination, supra n. 171, at 192.
180. Wojtyla, supra n. 58, at 200 (discussing the human person's ability to develop in virtue
through self-mastery of the sensual and emotional spheres of the interior life).
181. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I, 83, 1; and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 156, 244 (defining
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the judgment of conscience."' The human conscience is both intimately
personal to each individual and the interior font of transcendent moral
principles. 83 The primacy of conscience means that the individual may
be neither forced to act contrary to his/her conscience nor prevented
from acting in accord with it.' 8 4  From a Biblical perspective, the
anthropological capacities of reason, intentionality and conscience are
created good but disordered by evil.' 85 The human mind is often a
tangle of conflicting judgments about how the person ought to act. For
the self-possessed person, the formation of conscience remains an
ongoing and life-long project. 8 6 The formation enables one to assume
responsibility for past acts. The process also entails the recognition that
the subjective conscience itself may be incomplete or erroneous. 87 The
primacy of individual conscience must always be respected.
Nevertheless, formation of conscience, devoid of selfishness, pride,
resentment and other human weaknesses, profits from the light of
external sources of natural and supernatural wisdom.
B. Canon Law, Individual Dignity and the Common Good
The CIC-1983 safeguards the integrity of each individual person by
upholding the primacy of conscience. 8' The choice of a state of life, for
example, may never be coerced. 8 9 This is particularly true in the case of
marriage as the individuals must be free to consent to the natural and
sacred covenant.' 90 A series of canons details the factors that mitigate
and/or remove individual freedom to consent.' 9 The individual right to
evil as the absence of good and discussing the freedom of the human will).
182. John Paul II, supra n. 80, at 54 (discussing the link between freedom and conscience).
183. Id. at 54-60 (describing conscience as the individual's "inner sanctuary" and the witness
to the "universal and objective norm of morality").
184. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 916 (describing conscience as "man's most secret core,
and his sanctuary").
185. Von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 43-72 (comparing the imperfectability of the person with
the action of grace).
186. John Paul II, supra n. 80, at 64 (discussing the formation of conscience).
187. Id. at 62 (describing erroneous conscience).
188. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 916-917 (the primacy of conscience means that in the
conscience the human person encounters a law implanted by God).
189. CIC-1983, Canon 219 ("All Christ's faithful have the right to immunity from any kind of
coercion in choosing a state in life.").
190. Ladislas Orsy, Marriage In Canon Law: Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions
61 (M. Glazier 1988) (discussing the significance of free consent to Catholic marriage).
191. These factors recognized in the CIC-1983 include, inter alia, a minimum age requirement
(Canon 1083), abduction (Canon 1089), lack of the sufficient use of reason (Canon 1095, 1),
grave lack of understanding concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations (Canon
1095, 20), psychological factors that render a person incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage (Canon 1095, 30), error of person (Canon 1097), deceit or fraud (Canon
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privacy also demonstrates concern for individual integrity.'92 Canon law
draws a distinction between the internal and external fora. The internal
forum is recognized precisely to respect individual privacy. All
information that falls within the parameters of the internal forum must
be kept secret. For example, in the internal forum of sacramental
confession, the priest-confessor must keep as inviolate the identity of the
penitent and the matters revealed. 93 A direct violation of the seal of
confession results in an automatic excommunication. 94  Novices and
seminarians are free to confess to any priest, and their ecclesial superiors
should not ordinarily hear their confessions.' 95
Although canon law respects individual dignity, the emphasis of
the rights language in the CIC-1983 is not the proclamation of subjective
rights per se. Canon law views rights in conjunction with corresponding
responsibilities. 96  The approach to free speech demonstrates the
balance. Section 3 of Canon 212 stipulates that the speech right is to be
exercised with regard for: (1) the integrity of faith and morals; (2) the
appropriate reverence due to pastors; (3) the common good; and (4) the
1098), force or fear (Canon 1103). For critical analysis of the way in which Church tribunals
sometimes apply these factors, see Robert H. Vasoli, What God has Joined Together: The
Annulment Crisis in American Catholicism 46-65 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (arguing that tribunals
in the United States have in general adopted a liberal "pastoral approach" to annulments which
does not respect the intent of the canonical legislation).
192. Francisco Javier Urrutia, Internal Forum-External Forum: The Criterion of Distinction,
in Vatican II: Assessment and Persepctives Twenty-Five Years After (1962-1987) vol. 1, 634
(Rend Latourelle ed., Paulist Press 1988) (discussing the theological and canonical criteria for the
distinction between the fora).
193. CIC-1983, Canon 983 § 1 ("The sacramental seal is inviolable. Accordingly, it is
absolutely wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever,
whether by word or in any other fashion.").
194. CIC-1983, Canon 1388 § 1 ("A confessor who directly violates the sacramental seal[
incurs a latae sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See; he who does so only
indirectly is to be punished according to the gravity of the offence.").
195. CIC-1983, Canon 985:
The director and assistant director of novices, and the rector of a seminary or of any
other institute of education, are not to hear the sacramental confessions of their students
resident in the same house, unless in individual instances the students of their own
accord request it.
Canon 246 § 4 requires that seminarians and novices be free to choose their own spiritual
directors.
196. Tierney, supra n. 163, at 171 (The medieval canonists' attention to the language of
fundamental rights and responsibilities was not focused on individual subjectivity. Recognizing
the essentially social nature of the human being, the canonists discussed ius naturale in the
context of communities and corporate groups. They defended certain fundamental rights through
the use of natural law concepts. The rights to private property, marriage, procedural safeguards in
litigation, free consent to agreements and privacy of conscience in the internal forum were among
those natural rights that helped to define of the social order of the medieval world. The canonists
drew charters of rights to be exercised by local communities, guilds, colleges, churches and the
emerging city-states.).
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dignity of persons. The first two of the qualifications, regard for faith
and morals and respect for pastors, claim an obvious theological
justification. At the same time, they are also warranted by the natural
law. Proper regard for the integrity of faith and morals contributes to the
common good. Respect for pastors is consistent with the fourth
qualification of the dignity of persons.
The third qualification is identical to the common good
requirement of the Thomistic definition of law. 197 Vatican II defined the
common good as: "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow
groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready
access to their own fulfillment."'1 98 The notion of canonical rights is
never strictly subjective or absolute. It transpires in a social context in
which individuals may discover fulfillment. No individual possess a
legal right to act in a manner that detracts from the sum of conditions of
the common life. When all four of Canon 212's qualifications are
considered as a whole-individual dignity, the common good, faith and
the moral life-they may be said to contain the essential philosophical
and theological values in the Christian understanding of what it means to
be human. The four qualifications pertain to the exercise of all rights in
the Church. They attest to the unity of law and theology.
C. Faith and Community
Wojtyla notes that membership in society is not synonymous with
the participation through which the human person experiences
fulfillment.'99 The linguistic distinction between the terms "society" and
''community" reflects the difference between associational relationships
and relationships that entail a deeper level of personal commitment and
fulfillment. °o Membership in the Church involves this deeper level of
personal commitment and fulfillment. It entails the willingness of the
baptized person to entrust him/herself to the community and accept the
197. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-Il, 90, 4, c. (defining law as an "ordinance of reason
for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated").
198. Gaudium et Spes, supra n. 14, at 927-928.
199. Pursuant to contemporary Catholic social teaching, such participation is only possible in
those subsidiary structures that facilitate the formation of genuine community. In Catholic social
thought, subsidiary structures are considered a necessary condition for the creation of community.
Moreover, it is recognized that the human person, as a social being, gravitates for authentic
fulfillment to such subsidiary structures. Pope Pius XI formulated what has become the classic
statement of the principle of subsidiarity. Pius Pp. XI, "Litterae Encyclicae Quadragesimo Anno
(Die 15 m. maii a. 1931)," 23 AAS 177 (1931).
200. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 278 ("Within the community we find the human being, with all
his dynamism, as one of its members ... 'society' objectivizes the community or a number of
mutually complementary communities.").
[Vol. XIX
CANON LA WAND THE HUMAN PERSON
wisdom of an accumulated tradition.2°
Catholic faith is never merely a private religious experience. Book
II of the CIC-1983, entitled The People of God, reflects the
anthropological assumption that participation is necessary to individual
fulfillment. The principles of individual equality and ecclesial hierarchy
permeate the canons.0 2 The principle of equality recognizes the domain
of the individual. The person acts as a subject to constitute him/herself
through the intentionality of the will. Book II starts with Canon 204-
207, which establish the criteria for membership in the Church. Canon
208 states that all the baptized enjoy "a genuine equality of dignity and
action" in forming the "Body of Christ." Through Baptism, each
member of the Church participates in the priestly, prophetic and kingly
office of Christ.203  Following the opening canons concerning
membership, Canons 209-223 next enumerate the individual rights
enjoyed by all the baptized. The placement of the lex ecclesiae
fundamentalis immediately after the canons on membership evinces the
legislative intent to link the fundamental equality of all the baptized with
individual rights and responsibilities.
The complementary principle of hierarchy functions to safeguard
an ancient but dynamic faith tradition. Section II of Book II concerns
the hierarchical nature of the Church. Canon 330 affirms the belief that
Christ formed the original apostolic communio with Peter at its head and
intended the bishops as apostolic successors. 204  They are vested with
hierarchical office to teach, sanctify and govern in the Church. 205  The
201. John Paul I, supra n. 46, at 31-34 (describing the movement from trust in knowledge
acquired by others to Christian faith).
202. J. Hervada, Commentary on Book II, in Code of Canon Law Annotated: Latin-English
Edition of the Code of Canon Law and English-Language Translation of the 5th Spanish-
Language Edition of the Commentary Prepared under the Responsibility of the Instituto Martin de
Azpilcueta 185 (Ernest Caparros, Michel Thrriault & Jean Thorn eds., Wilson & Lafleur Limite
1993) (discussing the principles of radical equality and variety as the two basic principles of Book
II of the CIC-1983).
203. CIC-1983, Canon 208 ("Flowing from their rebirth in Christ, there is a genuine equality
of dignity and action among all of Christ's faithful. Because of this equality they all contribute,
each according to his or her own condition and office, to the building up of the Body of Christ.").
204. CIC-1983, Canon 330 ("Just as, by the decree of the Lord, Saint Peter and the rest of the
Apostles form one College, so for a like reason the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, and the
Bishops, the successors of the Apostles, are united together in one."). According to Catholic
belief, Christ originally entrusted the faith to the Twelve Apostles with the mission to teach,
sanctify and govern. CIC-1983, Canon 331 focuses on the divine institution of the Petrine
ministry as the head of "the College of Bishops, the Vicar of Christ, and the Pastor of the
universal Church here on earth."
205. CIC-1983, Canon 375 § 1 ("By divine institution, Bishops succeed the Apostles through
the Holy Spirit who is given to them. They are constituted Pastors in the Church, to be the
teachers of doctrine, the priests of sacred worship and the ministers of governance.").
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"sacred power" of pastors is not intended as one stemming from
personal ambition but the holiness of the objective hierarchical office.
The pastor's humble service respects the individual Christian's
experience of Christ.20 6 As a result, the experience is nurtured, deepened
and shared in the context of the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic
Church. 207
Pursuant to Book II, a variety of smaller communal units afford the
context in which one lives Catholic faith. The most common of these
canonical structures is the parish. Canon 515 defines the parish as a
portion of the people of God established within a diocese and entrusted
to the care of a priest as pastor.08 Pursuant to the principle of radical
equality, each member of the parish community receives the same
fundamental call to a life of faith and holiness. 2°  The canonical and
sacramental structure of the local parish community invites the
individual believer to deepen the spiritual dimension of life. Love for
truth leads the individual to enter into a dialog with the faith tradition.
The dialog is an encounter with the holy mystery of a perfect love.
Participation in the faith community elicits a deepening level of trust.
Spiritual solidarity with other members of the faith community fills an
individual believer with peace, joy and faith.
The priest shares in the bishop's pastoral office of service to the
local community. 2t0 Book II recognizes the parish priest as the Minister
206. Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, "Lumen Gentium," in Vatican Council II: The
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents 350, 381-387 (Austin Flannery ed., Liturgical Press
1992) (teaching that the hierarchical offices of bishop and priest are ministerial examples of the
self-emptying of Christ, which is the example for all Christians; St. Bonaventure, Lignum Vitae 7,
in 8 Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia, edita studio et cura pp. Collegii a S.
Bonaventura 72 (Quaracchi ed. 1882) ("So complete was his humility, that He who was perfect
justice subjected himself to the Law.").
207. CIC-1983, Canon 369 (second emphasis added):
A diocese is a portion of the people of God, which is entrusted to a Bishop to be nurtured
by him, with the cooperation of the presbyterium, in such a way that, remaining close to
its pastor and gathered by him through the Gospel and the Eucharist in the Holy Spirit, it
constitutes a particular Church. In this Church, the one, holy, catholic and apostolic
Church of Christ truly exists and functions.
Avery Dulles, The Catholicity of the Church 131-133 (Clarendon Press 1985) (discussing the
marks of the Church).
208. CIC-1983, Canon 515 § 1 ("A parish is a certain community of Christ's faithful stably
established within a particular Church, whose pastoral care, under the authority of the diocesan
Bishop, is entrusted to a parish priest as its proper pastor.").
209. CIC-1983, Canon 529 § 2 ("The parish priest is to recognise and promote the specific role
which the lay members of Christ's faithful have in the mission of the Church.
210. CIC-1983, Canon 519:
The parish priest is the proper pastor of the parish entrusted to him. He exercises the
pastoral care of the community entrusted to him under the authority of the diocesan
Bishop, whose ministry of Christ he is called to share, so that for this community he may
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of the Word, Sacrament and Pastoral Charity." Canons 528 and 529
express the relationship between the individual and parish priest. The
language of the canons urges the priest to: proclaim the entirety of the
word, nourish by devout liturgical celebration, collaborate with the
faithful, promote social justice, lead in prayer, strive to know the faithful
entrusted to his care, share in their anxieties and fears, comfort the sick
and dying, prudently correct, solicitously restore to the sacraments,
foster family life and seek out the poor, suffering, lonely and exiled. 2
The language of the canons portrays an image of the parish priest in
which the priest respects, assists and guides the individual parishioner.
Consistent with this image, the law requires the priest to recognize and
promote the mission of the laity in the Church especially by fostering
their religious associations.2 3 The priest's vocation is nourished by his
participation in the lives of the individuals, families and associations that
comprise the community entrusted to his pastoral care.
The parish represents an in-between point on a spectrum of
associational relationships. The family remains the most fundamental of
the communities that engender participation and solidarity. Reciprocity
carry out the offices of teaching, sanctifying and ruling with the cooperation of other
priests or deacons and with the assistance of lay members of Christ's faithful, in
accordance with the law.
211. CIC-1983, Canon 528 § 1 ("The parish priest has the obligation of ensuring that the word
of God is proclaimed in its entirety to those living in the parish."); § 2 ("The parish priest is to
take care that the blessed Eucharist is the centre of the parish assembly of the faithful. He is to
strive to ensure that Christ's faithful are nourished by the devout celebration of the sacraments
.); Canon 529 § 1, infra, n. 212; and Joseph A. Janicki, Parishes, Pastors and Parochial
Vicars, in The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary 415 (James A. Coriden, Thomas J.
Green & Donald E. Heintschel eds., Paulist Press 1985) (identifying the parish priest as the
Minister of Word, Sacrament and Pastoral Charity).
212. CIC-1983, Canon 529 § 1:
So that he may fulfil his office of pastor diligently, the parish priest is to strive to know
the faithful entrusted to his care. He is therefore to visit their families, sharing especially
in their cares, anxieties, and sorrows, comforting them in the Lord. If in certain matters
they are found wanting, he is prudently to correct them. He is to help the sick and
especially the dying in great charity, solicitously restoring them with the sacraments and
commending their souls to God. He is to be especially diligent in seeking out the poor,
the suffering, the lonely, those who are exiled from their homeland, and those burdened
with special difficulties. He is to strive also to ensure that spouses and parents are
sustained in the fulfillment of their proper duties, and to foster the growth of christian
life in the family.
213. CIC-1983, Canon 529 § 2:
The parish priest is to recognise and promote the specific role which the lay members of
Christ's faithful have in the mission of the Church, fostering their associations which
have religious purposes. He is to cooperate with his proper Bishop and with the
presbyterium of the diocese. Moreover, he is to endeavor to ensure that the faithful are
concerned for the community of the parish, that they feel themselves to be members both
of the diocese and of the universal Church, and that they take part in and sustain works
which promote this community.
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occurs between these two fundamental forms of religious solidarity.
True to the form of associational relationships, these fundamental
experiences of solidarity symbolically communicate the goodness of
transcendence. The parish does not exist as a self-sustaining unit but
rather as a part of the diocese and the universal Church.2 14  The free
choice to cede a degree of autonomy endows the individual believer not
only with an individual moral participation but a corporate identity. As
a portion of the Christian faithful, the parish reflects the original
communio of the Twelve around the Lord.2" One participates not only
on the local level but also in a much larger historical reality. Solidarity
with the members of the local community coincides with solidarity with
the universal Church.216
The definition of the parish in Canon 515 then represents the
canonical attempt to express the mystery of communio in terms of the
radical equality of all the faithful and hierarchical constitution of the
universal Church. The principle of equality means that all of the
baptized participate fully in the call to holiness. It complements the
principle of hierarchy that understands office in the Church, not as a
matter of secular power or prestige, but of humble service in promoting
the historical continuity of Catholic faith. Canon law's attention to
equality, an ordered ecclesial life and the continuity of faith attests to a
balanced concept of freedom.
The concept of freedom in the CIC-1983 can claim both
philosophical and theological justifications. Philosophically, the
canonical structures are intended to facilitate the human person's
participation in the communal project.2 17 This stands in opposition to a
214. John A. Renken, Parishes and Pastors in New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law
673, 676 (John P. Beal, James A. Coriden & Thomas J. Green eds., Paulist Press 2000) ("The
parish is a part of the particular church, not an autonomous entity."); and James A. Coriden, The
Parish in Catholic Tradition: History, Theology and Canon Law 101-103 (Paulist Press 1997)
(discussing the parish as part of the diocese).
215. CIC-1983, Canons 368, 369 (confirming that the universal church is present and operative
in the particular churches located throughout the world, each of which is presided over by a
bishop, and that the parish community is entrusted to the pastoral care of a priest, who cooperates
in the apostolic ministry of the bishop, to mediate the economy of salvation to the members of the
local community).
216. Ratzinger, supra n. 119, at 843 (indicating about communio that the Church is greater
than the sum of its parts). A debate has ensued between Cardinal Ratzinger and Cardinal Walter
Kasper concerning the autonomy of the local churches especially, as expressed in pastoral
practices. For a summary of this discussion, see Walter Kasper, On the Church America 8 (Apr.
23-30, 2001) (arguing for greater flexibility) and Joseph Ratzinger, The Local Church and the
Universal Church America 7 (Nov. 19, 2001) (stressing the unity of the Church in the centrality of
the universal Church).
217. Wojtyla, supra n. 15, at 280-281 (discussing participation in the community and the
common good).
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merely negative concept of human freedom, which defines freedom as
the absence of constraint on the individual. While such a conception
may yield the optimal conditions for the autonomous individual to
pursue subjective ends, it tends to give rise to alienation rather than
participation and solidarity.28 The personalism of canon law yields a
theory of rights grounded in the idea that human freedom carries with it
responsibility. 9 It is a positive freedom to choose and act in accord
with what is good, just and charitable. It holds that the more one
engages free will in accord with the inner spirit of the law, the more true
freedom one enjoys. Canon law admits no intrinsic opposition between
the freedom of the human person and the participation in the common
endeavor. To the contrary, it recognizes that authentic human freedom
lies, not in the exercise of unlimited personal autonomy, but in the
fulfillment of the ontological dignity of each individual to participate
freely in human community.220
Theologically, such participation offers the hope of sanctification
as a member of the "Mystical Body of Christ. '22' In attempting to
fathom the meaning of the theology of the Mystical Body, St.
Bonaventure observed that the cross is absolutely the key to
everything.222 For Bonaventure, the blood and water, which flowed
from the open side of the crucified Jesus, symbolize the origin and
growth of the Church.223 At the core of the theological language is the
faith claim of an intimate nexus between the mission of Christ and the
foundation of the Church.224 To be a member of the Mystical Body is
both to possess an individual moral integrity and a corporate identity in
the communion of the "one bread, one body., 225  The canonical
218. Id. at 296-297 (identifying the roots of alienation).
219. Id. at 281-282 (discussing "personalism" in reference to the common good).
220. Id. at 122 (describing the function of free will in self-possession and human action).
221. Pius Pp. XII, "Litterae Encyclicae Mystici Corporis Christi (Die 29 m. iunii a. 1943)," 35
AAS 193-248 (1943) (teaching about the nature of the Church through the image of the Mystical
Body of Christ); and Tierney, supra n. 163, at 164 (discussing the importance to the image of the
Mystical Body in the medieval church and law).
222. St. Bonaventure, De triplica Via, alias Incendium amoris ch. 3, § 3, in 8 Doctoris
Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia, edita studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura 14
(Quaracchi ed. 1882) ("All things are manifested in the cross.").
223. St. Bonaventure, Lignum Vitae, 7, in 8 Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia,
edita studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura 72 (Quaracchi ed. 1882) (locating the origins of
the Church in the blood and water of Christ's wounded side).
224. Lumen Gentium, supra n. 206, at 2, 3 & 4 (describing the kenotic self-emptying of the
triune God to the sending of the Incarnate Word into human history to the mission of the Church).
225. I Cor 10:17. See Tierney, supra n. 4, at 70, n. 90, citing D. 86 c. 21; D. 42 ante c. 1; C.
12 q. 1 c. 2; and D. 47 c. 8 (The medieval canonists recognized as a requirement of membership
that the rich share at least from their abundance with the poor. They crafted statements of binding
moral obligations such as: "Feed the poor. If you do not feed them you kill them"; "A man who
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structures are intended to reflect the theological belief that every
member is called to live this Mystery in humble service and self-
sacrificial love.
These philosophical and theological perspectives reflect a balance
of negative and positive freedom. Canon law attempts to protect
individual liberty through the recognition of fundamental rights
especially with regard to privacy, reputation and conscience. This
validity of the negative freedom from authoritarian constraint depends
on its integration with the positive value of freedom. The human will
finds fulfillment not through radical autonomy but through the
individual dignity discovered in participation and solidarity. Canon law
aims to set the conditions in which the individual becomes more fully
human by exercising the will to develop intellectually, morally,
aesthetically and spiritually.
D. Canonical Equity and the Salvation of Souls
While theological anthropology expresses optimism about the
faculties of reason and will, it also affirms the doctrine of original sin.226
The doctrine maintains that the human faculties of reason and will are
limited and imperfect.227 The anthropological appreciation of a fallen
human nature in need of redemption endows canon law with a finite
quality that is grounded in the imperfection of human reason and will.
228
Given the imperfections of nature, grace is necessary in order for the
human person to understand the fullness of truth and to act in accord
with the good.2 9 No mere human effort can suffice. Although the law
keeps more for himself than he needs is guilty of theft"; "The use of all things that are in the world
ought to be common to all"; and "No one may call his own what is common, of which if he takes
more than he needs, it is obtained by violence .... The bread that you hold back belongs to the
needy, the clothes that you store away belong to the naked."); and Brian Tierney, Origins of
Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 1150-1250, in Rights, Laws and Infallibility in
Medieval Thought 639 (Variorum 1997).
226. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I1, 81, 1 ("According to the Catholic Faith we are
bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants by way of
origin."); and von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 87-101 (discussing the effect of original sin as
humanity's inability to accept divine love, which love offers the only hope for human wholeness).
227. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-Il, 83, 2 (stating that original sin causes disorder in
the soul, first reaching the will and then proceeding to the intellect).
228. Von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 207 (suggesting that the fallen nature of the intellect and
will are still capable of producing reason and freedom but not the ultimate act of self-
transcendence without supernatural assistance).
229. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-II, 109, 1-2 (The first article posits that the person
may know the truth through natural means, but needs grace to know truth which surpasses natural
knowledge. The second article states that the disordered nature of the human person after the Fall
is in need of grace in order to desire an act for the good); and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 343 ("Grace
does not suppress nature ... so also theology does not suppress philosophy ... they add to them
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aims to set the optimal conditions for human self-transcendence, no
merely human law can achieve salvation.230
With the final words of the CIC-1983, the Supreme Legislator
envisions that the law will be applied "observing canonical equity and
keeping in mind the salvation of souls, which in the Church must always
be the supreme law."231' The juridic principles of equity and the
salvation of souls point to the transcendent end of the human person.
Their inclusion in the law indicates the legislative intent to maintain the
unity of law and theology.
Gratian identified equity with the transcendent values of the natural
law.232  Building on Gratian's thought, Hostiensis (ca. 1200-1271)
described canonical equity as "justice tempered by sweet mercy. '233 He
expanded the notion of canonical equity to include both natural justice
and evangelical mercy.234 Equity points to the limits of the law. The
unity of law and theology is never perfect. Therefore, the application of
the law in certain instances falls short of its ecclesial purpose.
Canonical equity attempts to bridge the gap.
Canonical equity, may be written or unwritten. Written equity
occurs when the statute expressly requires an application of equity.235
Canon 19, for example, provides that canonical equity fill the lacuna
legis.23 6  In addition, the CIC-1983 includes six other instances of
and they bring them to perfection.").
230. Robert Song, Christianity and Liberal Society 219 (Clarendon Press 1997) (discussing the
loss of transcendence and the burden it places on "earthly politics"); and Corecco, supra n. 2, at
134 ("[C]anon law goes to the very level of the ultimate and supernatural destiny of human beings
and their salvation.").
231. CIC-1983, Canon 1752 ("In cases of transfer, the provisions of can. 1747 are to be
applied, always observing canonical equity and keeping in mind the salvation of souls, which in
the Church must always be the supreme law.").
232. D. 1, c. 7; and Maurice Amen, Canonical Equity Before the Code, 33 Jurist 256, 266
(1973) (Equity for Gratian meant that which would constitute the supreme ideal of justice.).
233. Commentaria in V Decretalium Libros, I, c. 11, X, De transactionibus, I, 36 (1581); and
Charles Lefebvre, Natural Equity and Canonical Equity, 8 Natural L. Forum 122, 123 (1963)
(Hostiensis attributed the phrase to St. Cyprian.).
234. Lefebvre, supra n. 233, at 123 (suggesting that canonical equity's "Christian impress"
distinguishes it from natural equity); Charles Lefebvre, Hostiensis, maitre de lPquiti canonique,
28 Ephemerides luris Canonici 11-20 (1972) (attributing the special characteristics of the
canonical equity to Hostiensis); and John J. Coughlin, Canonical Equity, 30 Studia Canonica 403,
406-418 (1996) (comparing Hostiensis' notion of canonical equity to that of natural equity in the
thought of St. Thomas and Suarez).
235. Charles Lefebvre, Equity in Canon Law, in Equity in the World's Legal Systems: A
Comparative Study 94-103 (Ralph A. Newman ed., Etablissements Emile Bruylant 1973)
(comparing the functions of written and unwritten equity).
236. CIC-1983, Canon 19 (emphasis added):
If on a particular matter there is not an express provision of either universal or particular
law, nor a custom, then, provided it is not a penal matter, the question is to be decided by
taking into account laws enacted in similar matters, the general principles of law
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expressed equity in the statute.237 Unwritten canonical equity informs
discretionary decisions and corrects the unjust application of law. 238 For
those vested with discretionary authority, unwritten equity serves as a
general interpretive principle.239 It is an aspect of the legislator's intent,
identified as a general interpretative principle in Canon 17.24o In the face
of an unjust result, canonical equity also permits one vested with
governing power to correct the injustice on the ground that it would not
comport with the legislator's intent.241
Canon law presumes that certain qualities remain characteristic of
the mind of the lawgiver. Consistent with the Christian understanding
of the human person, these characteristics include the intention to
conform to the natural law through the use of right reason, to be
intelligent and humane, to act in conformity with the common good and,
above all else, to put on the charity and love of Christ.242 Christian
anthropology is ultimately discovered in the person of Christ. The
promise of the interrelation between canon law and anthropology is only
fulfilled to the extent that it reveals Christ's perfect truth, justice and
love. The strong role of canonical equity renders the canon law with a
dynamic quality in developing and interpreting legal principles in accord
with the Christian understanding of what it means to be human.2 43  It
observed with canonical equity, the jurisprudence and practice of the Roman Curia, and
the common and constant opinion of learned authors.
237. CIC-1983, Canon 221 § 2 (a judge must apply the law in accord with equity); Canon 271
§ 3 (natural equity must be observed in an agreement between bishops to move a cleric from one
diocese to another); Canon 686 § 3 (equity and charity must be observed in imposing
exclaustration on a religious); Canon 702 § 2 (equity and evangelical charity must be observed by
a religious community in providing financial assistance to a member who has been dismissed);
Canon 1148 § 3 (urging justice, Christian charity and natural equity concerning the wives of a
man, in a polygamous marriage, who receives baptism); and Canon 1752 (requiring the
application of canonical equity to the transfer of a pastor).
238. Charles Lefebvre, tquitj, in Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique vol. 5, 394 (Letouzey et
An6 1953) (Canonical equity supplements and corrects the strict application of the law when it
would conflict with the equitable characteristics of the mind of the lawgiver.).
239. Orsy, supra n. 9, at 60-63 (discussing canonical equity as an interpretative principle).
240. CIC-1983, Canon 17 (emphasis added):
Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper meaning of the words
considered in their text and context. If the meaning remains doubtful or obscure, there
must be recourse to parallel places, if there be any, to the purpose and circumstances of
the law, and to the mind of the legislator.
241. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at 1-11, 96, 6 (When the enemy is in pursuit of the
defenders of a besieged city, equity would permit the opening of the city gates, contrary to the
strict application of law, as such an interpretation comports with the general welfare of the city
and the mind of the lawgiver.).
242. Lefebvre, supra n. 132, at 100 (describing the presumed characteristics of the mind of the
lawgiver to be reasonable and humane).
243. Orsy, supra n. 9, at 60 ("[C]anon law must always remain fully integrated with, and
dependent on, religious and human values.").
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thus serves as an animating principle that functions to prevent the dead
letter of the law from obscuring its inner meaning.
From the personalist perspective, it is, however, the primacy of the
principle of salus animarum (the salvation of souls), which ultimately
demonstrates the transcendent purpose of the canon law.2 " The CIC-
1983 makes readily evident the concern for the salvation of souls in the
administration of the sacraments to those in periculo mortis (in danger
of death).245  Filled with "effusive charity," the parish priest is to be
solicitous in aiding the dying by "restoring them with the sacraments
and commending their souls to God., 246 When his or her own minister
is not readily available, even a Christian who is not in full communion
with Rome may receive the sacraments from a Catholic minister. The
Christian in danger of death must request the sacraments and indicate a
catholic understanding. 47 The principle of the salvation of souls, in fact,
244. Helmholz, supra n. 4, at 395 (concern for salus animarum was one of the principal
characteristics of medieval canon law).
245. In addition to the canonical provisions discussed in this paragraph above, see CIC-1983,
Canon 865 § 2 (an adult in danger of death, who has manifested in some way the desire, may be
baptized even with only some knowledge of the principal truths of the faith); Canon 867 § 2 (an
infant in danger of death is to be baptized immediately); Canon 868 § 2 (an infant in danger of
death is baptized licitly, even if the Catholic or non-Catholic parents are opposed to it); Canon 891
(a minor in danger of death who has not reached the age of discretion may be confirmed in the
Latin Church); Canon 883, 3 (any priest may administer the Sacrament of Confirmation in a
danger of death situation); Canon 913 § 2 (in danger of death, even a child who has not been
prepared through catechesis may receive first communion as long as the child is able to
distinguish the Eucharist from ordinary food); Canon 921 § 2 (a person in danger of death may
receive the Eucharist even when they have previously partaken of the Sacrament on the same
day); Canon 961 § 1 (a priest may administer general absolution when there is danger of death and
there is no time to hear the individual confessions of the penitents, such as in the case of war or
other extreme emergency); Canon 977 (a priest may validly absolve an accomplice, who is in
danger of death, of a sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue); Canon 1068 (in the
absence of any contrary indications, it is sufficient that the parties, who desire to be married and
are in danger of death, assert the lack of impediments to their celebration of Matrimony); Canon
1079 §§ 1-3 (establishing the conditions when the bishop, parish priest or confessor may dispense
parties in danger of death from ecclesiastical impediments to Matrimony) and Canon 1116 § 1, 10
(when the requisite sacred minister cannot be present or approached without grave inconvenience,
persons in danger of death may enter into marriage as long as there are two witnesses).
246. C[C-1983, Canon 529 § I (emphasis added):
So that he may fulfil his office of pastor diligently, the parish priest is to strive to know
the faithful entrusted to his care. He is therefore to visit their families, sharing especially
in their cares, anxieties and sorrows, comforting them in the Lord. If in certain matters
they are found wanting, he is prudently to correct them. He is to help the sick and
especially the dying in great charity, solicitously restoring them with the sacraments and
commending their souls to God. He is to be especially diligent in seeking out the poor,
the suffering, the lonely, those who are exiled from their homeland, and those burdened
with special difficulties. He is to strive also to ensure that spouses and parents are
sustained in the fulfillment of their proper duties, and to foster the growth of christian
life in the family.
247. CIC-1983, Canon 844 § 4:
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permits the dying Christian to receive the sacraments from any priest.
This includes the priest who lacks faculties or jurisdiction to administer
the sacraments, even one who has incurred a latae sententiae (non-
pronounced) censure such as excommunication or interdict.148  A priest
who lacks the proper faculties to hear confessions may validly absolve a
penitent, in periculo mortis, when the penitent requests, even if an
approved priest is present.249
The CIC-1983 does not limit the principle of salus animarum to
those in danger of death. In determining whether or not to suspend the
execution of a decree, a superior must insure that the salvation of souls
suffers no harm.25 0 The bishop must keep it in mind when transferring a
pastor to another parish or position. 21' The salvation of souls is the basis
for the Church's right and obligation to address the social order in the
proclamation of moral values and the protection of fundamental human
rights. 2  The principle guides the priest in the hearing of all
If there is a danger of death or if, in the judgement of the diocesan Bishop or of the
Bishops' Conference, there is some other grave and pressing need, catholic ministers
may lawfully administer these same sacraments to other christians not in full communion
with the catholic Church, who cannot approach a minister of their own community and
who spontaneously ask for them, provided that they demonstrate the catholic faith in
respect of these sacraments and are properly disposed.
248. CIC-1983, Canon 1335:
If censure prohibits the celebration of the sacraments or sacramentals or the exercise of a
power of governance, the prohibition is suspended whenever this is necessary to provide
for the faithful who are in danger of death. If a latae sententiae censure has not been
declared, the prohibition is also suspended whenever one of the faithful requests a
sacrament or sacramental or an act of the power of governance; for any just reason it is
lawful to make such a request.
249. CIC-1983, Canon 976 ("Any priest, even though he lacks the faculty to hear confessions,
can validly and lawfully absolve any penitents who are in danger of death, from any censures and
sins, even if an approved priest is present.").
250. CIC-1983, Canon 1736 § 2:
In others [sic] cases, unless within ten day [sic] of receiving the petition mentioned in
can. 1734 the author of the decree has decreed its suspension, an interim suspension can
be sought from the author's hierarchical Superior. This Superior can decree the
suspension only for serious reasons and must always take care that the salvation of souls
suffers no harm.
CIC-1983, Canon 1737 § 3:
Even in those cases in which recourse does not by law suspend the execution of the
decree, or in which the suspension is decreed in accordance with can. 1736 § 2, the
Superior can for a serious reason order that the execution be suspended, but is to take
care that the salvation of [souls] suffers no harm.
251. CIC-1983, Canon 1752 ("In cases of transfer, the provisions of can. 1747 are to be
applied, always observing canonical equity and keeping in mind the salvation of souls, which in
the Church must always be the supreme law.").
252. CIC-1983, Canon 747 § 2 ("The Church has the right always and everywhere to proclaim
moral principles, even in respect of the social order, and to make judgements about any human
matter in so far as this is required by fundamental human rights or the salvation of souls.").
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confessions.5 3 In its recognition that the human person is a spiritual
being, the principal is inherently anthropological. It constitutes a
manifestation that the law of the Church aims to facilitate a social order
in which the spiritual nature of the human person flourishes. As with
canonical equity, it is based upon the belief that law has not the power to
perfect the human intellect and will.
The eschatological dimension in Christian anthropology conveys
that law on its own cannot bring about the "kingdom to come. 254 The
eschatological insight holds that justification in the here and now, as
well as the consummation of time which is yet to come, are dependent
on divine love.2 15 From the perspective of the canonists, it is not that the
law should be abrogated. Rather, given the fallen nature of reality, the
vital function law plays in the community is inherently limited.2 56 The
recognition of law's limitations in the here and now, and its ultimate
inability to establish the kingdom to come, endows canon law with a
quality that functions to point beyond itself. The law's necessary but
imperfect justice serves as a reminder of the fallen human condition and
need for redemption by a source external to and above the human effort
of law. Law plays a symbolic function to affirm the spiritual dimension
of human existence.
IV. LIBERAL THEORY AND THE COMPARATIVE COUNTER LANGUAGE
The unity of law and theology serves a comparative function with
regard to mainstream legal theory's internal morality and concept of
freedom. The comparative function of the counter language raises a
series of critical anthropological questions. Does law based on liberal
legal theory doubt the capacity of the intellect to comprehend natural
and supernatural truth? If yes, has it lost its claim to an objective moral
basis grounded in the human person? Does the focus on subjective
253. CIC-1983, Canon 978 § 1 ("In hearing confessions the priest is to remember that he is at
once both judge and healer, and that he is constituted by God as a minister of both divine justice
and divine mercy, so that he may contribute to the honour of God and the salvation of souls.").
254. Song, supra n. 230, at 219 ("Without an eschatology which transcends and fulfils history,
the human aspiration for permanence and stability may translate itself into the project of seeking
the Kingdom of God on earth.").
255. loannes Paulus Pp. II, Sacra Disciplinae Leges, supra n. 1, at 51 ("[T]he purpose of the
Code is not in any way to replace faith, grace, charisms, and above all charity in the life of the
Church or of Christ's faithful.").
256. Id.:
[T]he Code rather looks toward the achievement of order in the ecclesial community,
such that while attributing a primacy to love, grace and the charisms, it facilitates at the
same time an orderly development in the life both of the ecclesial society and of the
individual persons who belong to it.
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autonomy in liberal legal theory militate against the formation of the
human person through participation and solidarity? Consistent with the
invention of self through the subjective will, has legal theory lost a
balanced perspective of rights and responsibilities in relation to the
common good? Do the anthropological assumptions that underpin
mainstream legal theory neglect the spiritual dimension of human
existence?
Prior to raising the anthropological questions, it is necessary to
clarify the function of the counter language. First, the counter language
is simply intended as a stimulus for examination. It is not intended to
suggest that the law of the modern secular democracy adopt the
anthropological assumptions of canon law. Second, in examining the
philosophical basis of law based upon liberal theory, it would be
erroneous to assume that the law simply reflects a direct translation of
the theory. A large variety of factors and contingencies influence
legislators and judges in shaping the law. These factors are not limited
to any one person's thought or any single philosophical theory. The
ideas of the liberal theorist have influenced and continue to influence the
development of law. However, the complex array of philosophical
values that underpin the law of the liberal state reflect the multifaceted
processes that yield specific legislative enactments and judicial opinions.
Third, although theological anthropology emphasizes community and
the individual's realization through it, the counter language is not
intended to eliminate the individual. The coercive power of the modem
state requires continuing vigilance for individual integrity and
autonomy. The counter language is intended as a possible balance to the
exaggerated claims sometimes raised on behalf of autonomy, equality
and secularity.
A. The Intellect and Law's Power to Bind
Due to its recognition of the equilibrium between faith and reason
in the human intellect, canon law affords a counter language to law
based on a less optimistic assessment of the capacities of the human
intellect. The rights language of canon law is grounded in both the
natural and supernatural goodness of the human person. The language
respects the natural capacities of the intellect to understand fundamental
rights and responsibilities. It also acknowledges the function of faith in
illuminating the intellect to understand truth. Just as the human intellect
has the capacity to know natural and supernatural truth, the CIC-1983
represents an effort to transpose these truths into canonical language. In
an irreducible unity, its outward form expresses a deeper intellectus of
[Vol. XIX
CANON LA WAND THE HUMAN PERSON
the law as objective even as it is open to historical development. Absent
the anthropological ground of canon law, one may ask what constitutes
the moral predicate of the law. In other words, from where does the
law's power to bind come?
257
Lon Fuller argued that positive law has its own internal morality. 8
A proponent of natural law, Fuller provided a typical liberal account of
the rule of law when he suggested that laws must be (1) general in
scope, (2) made in public, (3) not retrospective, (4) clear in meaning, (5)
enacted in conformity with approved procedure, (6) possible to enforce,
(7) stable and (8) enforced fairly.2 19 This description of the rule of law
guarantees certain zones of freedom through neutrality, equality and
fairness. Fuller's description, however, offers at best only a partial
account of the internal morality of law. To limit law's morality to the
principles of neutrality, equality and fairness may separate law from
other aspects of substantive morality such as the basic goods and first
principles of practical reason.26
Fuller's theory was at least in part a response to the "legal realist"
school of thought.261  The origins of legal realism may be traced to
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who repudiated the formalism of the
English common law and drew a sharp distinction between law and
morality.262 The distinction suited the needs of the radically autonomous
257. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 148-149 (1977) (posing the
question by contrasting a "public-interest model" with an "economic or public choice model."
The former "depends ... on a belief in the reality of public or objective values and ends for
human action," while the latter regards "all substantive values or ends as strictly private and
subjective.").
258. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 153 (Yale U. Press 1964) ("In presenting my analysis
of the law's internal morality I have insisted that it is, over a wide range of issues, indifferent
toward the substantive aims of law and is ready to serve a variety of such aims with equal
efficacy.").
259. Id. at 46-94 (discussing the qualities that render an internal objectivity to the rule of law).
260. George, supra n. 64, at 113 ("[The strict observance of legal forms by such rules cannot
guarantee that the laws ... will not be substantively unjust.").
261. American Legal Realism xiii-xiv (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A.
Reed eds., Oxford U. Press 1993) ("The heart of the [Legal Realist] movement was an effort to
define and discredit classical legal theory and practice and to offer in their place a more
philosophically and politically enlightened jurisprudence."); and John Henry Schlegel, American
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science 8 (U. N.C. Press 1995) (noting the Realists' focus on
empirical legal research and their attempt to convert policy preferences into law).
262. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1-2 (Little, Brown 1923) ("The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience. The substance of the law at any given time pretty
nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient."); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law. 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461-462 (1897); and Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, On Our Law and Its Study 12 (Oceana Publications 1951) ("It is
much more common to approach the law as being a set of rules of conduct, and most thinkers
would say rules of external conduct to distinguish them from the rules of morality.").
50 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XIX
individual, who was not bound by traditional morality. The realist
school called for the abrogation of the common law, with its deep roots
in natural justice and English custom and tradition, in favor of statutory
provisions, judicial precedent and administrative regulation.263
Roscoe Pound further developed the sociological implications of
Holmes' legal realism. Pound rejected the abstract content of formal
legal principles and advocated a methodology in which law continually
interacts with the prevalent political, economic and social circumstances
of a given society.264 Along similar lines, H.L.A. Hart argued that the
judges create law, in difficult or "indeterminate cases," based on the
conventional social rules accepted by the given society. 26  Hart
concluded that the internal legal authority of any societal norm
ultimately rested upon the external social values that are held by the
majority of the population.266 A different line of liberal thinking may be
found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, who suggested that when judges
decide cases they transcend conventional agreements and base their
decisions on "the soundest theory of the law. 2 67  It would seem,
however, that even Dworkin's soundest theories based on the "pedigrees
of precedents" are recognized as such not on account of objectivity but
rather the subjective preference of jurists.2 68  The counter language
263. Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial
Process 48-55 (Cornell U. Press 1968) (describing the realists skepticism about the formal rules of
the common law tradition); and cf Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1780-1860: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 30 (Harv. U. Press 1977) (suggesting that by 1820 the
shift in American jurisprudence from an understanding of law "as an eternal set of principles
expressed in custom and derived from natural law" to an understanding of law as an "instrument
of policy" was well underway).
264. Roscoe Pound, The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607, 611
(1907) ("The modem teacher of law should be a student of sociology, economics, and politics as
well."); and American Legal Realism, supra n. 261, at 232-236 (discussing legal realism and the
sociological jurisprudence).
265. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 113 (Oxford U. Press 1961) ("[R]ules of recognition
specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.").
266. Id. at 105:
Statements of legal validity made about particular rules in the day-to-day life of a legal
system whether by judges, lawyers or ordinary citizens do indeed carry with them certain
presuppositions. They are internal statements of law expressing the point of view of
those who accept the rule of recognition of the system.
267. Dworkin, supra n. 39, at 17 (describing law as "a set of special rules identified and
distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having to do not with their content but with their
pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or developed."); and E. Philip Soper, Legal
Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 473, 474-475
(1977) (describing the difference between the positions taken by Hart and Dworkin).
268. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 256 (Belknap Press Harv. U. Press 1986) ("Different
judges will disagree about each of these issues [of interpretations of precedent in difficult cases]
and will accordingly take different views of what the law of their community, properly
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serves a comparative analytical function with regard to liberal theory's
account of the intellectus of the law.
First, a question may be raised about the objectivity of the law.269
When justice relies principally on mere consensus, whether of society as
a whole, or of some specialized group, whatever standard happens to
prevail at a given historical moment and circumstance becomes the
reason of what is good, right and just. The result may be a language of
legal rights that ignores the natural and supernatural goodness of the
human person. During the twentieth century, the oppressive laws of
Facist and Marxist ideologies demonstrated the danger of law subject to
manipulation based on subjective preference. It may be argued that such
a danger does not apply to law based upon liberal theory. Liberal theory
calls for a government of limited powers. Moreover, there can be no
disputing that it has set the conditions for advances in terms of equality
of opportunity for participation in the political process and competitive
market. Important as these values may be, they fail to offer a full
account of the human good. Access to the market and political process
are only aspects of a much larger human good. The unrestrained desire
for financial gain can easily obscure important human values. The need
for a prosperous market economy may override concerns such as
education, healthcare, the arts and the environment. The law may
encourage a reductionistic image of the human person as producer and
consumer.
Perhaps most importantly, the law's objectivity depends on its
recognition of exceptionless moral norms that prohibit intrinsic evil.
The immense evils perpetrated during the twentieth century verify the
need for certain specific and negative prohibitions. Such absolute norms
admit no privileges for any individual or state.270 The limitation of law's
intellectus to autonomy, equality and government neutrality falls short of
the fullest possibilities for the human person. It runs the risk of
abdicating an internal and stable moral logic upon which positive law
can be predicated and against which standard it can be measured. The
counter language suggests that the objectivity of law requires an
intellectus that fosters a proper balance of individual rights and
responsibilities grounded in the nature of the human person.
understood, really is.").
269. Robert P. George, What is Law? A Century of Arguments, First Things 23, 29 (Apr.
2001) (discussing the importance of the "objectivity" of law).
270. John Paul II, supra n. 80, at 96.
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Second, the intellectus of mainstream legal theory often neglects
the spiritual nature of the human person.271 John Rawls, for example,
admits at most a quite limited role for theological values and language in
public discourse.272  Rawls' so-called "legitimacy principle" about the
tightly guarded secular parameters of reasoned public discourse may
deprive legal theory of a complete and balanced language. One can
readily appreciate the hesitancy about adopting the "comprehensive
worldview" of a particular religion or secular ideology in a democratic
and pluralistic society.27 3  Such legitimate concerns, however, do not
require that public discourse reject aspects of traditional theological
language. 274 The exclusively secular language of liberal theory neglects
potential linguistic allies.27 5  Rawls' theory of justice stresses the
importance of the "difference principle" which is consistent with
distributive justice.276 The argument for a system of distributive justice
is, of course, no stranger to the Catholic theological tradition.277 The
idea that the larger society has an obligation to the powerless and poor is
271. E.g. Rawls, supra n. 43, at 781 (asking whether it is even possible "for citizens of faith to
be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse society's intrinsic political ideals
and values"); and John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147-149 (Colum. U. Press 1996) (defining
public reason as an "overlapping consensus," and arguing that political power may not be
exercised on the basis of controversial religious values). Cf Song, supra n. 230, at 225-226
(suggesting that revelation offers a theological critique of liberalism); and Paul J. Weithman,
Citizenship and Public Reason 125, in Natural Law and Public Reason 156-162 (Robert P.
George & Christopher Wolfe eds., Georgetown U. Press 2000) (rejecting John Rawl's position
that citizens in the public forum ought not to make appeals to religious comprehensive world
views).
272. Patrick Neal, Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith, in Natural
Law and Public Reason 171, 177-178 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., Georgetown
U. Press 2000) (criticizing Rawls for not recognizing that persons with comprehensive religious
worldviews may dissent from the doctrines of political liberalism, not on selfish grounds, but
because they believe the liberal doctrine to be morally wrong).
273. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra n. 271, at 243:
What public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain their vote to one another in
terms of a reasonable balance of public political values, it being understood by everyone
that of course the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens is
thought by them to provide further and often transcendent backing for those values.
274. Michael J. Perry, The Idea ofHuman Rights, Four Inquiries 11-41 (Oxford U. Press
1998) (suggesting that human rights language must ultimately rest on a religious foundation).
275. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra n. 271, at 137 (arguing that the liberal principle of
legitimacy requires that questions of basic justice and constitutional law need to be settled by
principles and ideals upon which all citizens may be reasonably expected to endorse).
276. Rawls, supra n. 39, at 76-80 (describing the difference principle as requiring distribution
to the least advantaged).
277. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at 11-11, 61, 1 (describing distributive justice); Gaudium
et Spes, supra n. 14, at 975-976 (discussing the need for distributive justice in society for the just
distribution of material goods); and Finnis, supra n. 63, at 165-177 (describing distributive justice
from a philosophical perspective with notations to Catholic theology and social teaching).
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also not foreign to theological discourse. 278 Theological language would
serve to reinforce this fundamental conception of justice. The law's
recognition of the validity of theological language corresponds to the
capacity of the intellect for reason and faith as complementary forms of
human knowing.
Finally, the intellectus of the law based on mainstream theory may
result in the perception that the law's power to bind is conferred by
political power alone. Such a perception tends to reduce the law's
persuasive force to the coercive power of the state. The counter
language recognizes the role played by both reason and faith in the law's
justification. The process in which natural law tradition interacts with
historical consciousness corresponds to the capacity of the intellect. As
is the case for the individual person, law finds coherency through an
integration of the memory with the needs of the present moment. Faith
enhances what reason requires for the persuasiveness of the law. The
unity of law and theology endows the law with a transcendent
justification for individual compliance with the law. Deprived of an
internal morality grounded in the intellect's capacity for reason and
faith, law encounters difficulty in embodying the deepest ideals and
aspirations of the culture. It is unlikely to move the individual will to
choose the common interest over self-interest. The internal reason of the
law, thus, has an important relationship to the exercise of individual will.
B. The Will and Human Fulfillment
Consistent with the anthropological analysis, the CIC-1983
manifests an understanding of human freedom that integrates an abiding
human nature with the capacity for self-determination. Canon law is
intended to safeguard those social structures that set the optimal
conditions in which the individual may discover fulfillment through
participation and solidarity. Canon law recognizes the natural human
need for participation and solidarity as well as the spiritual desire for
communion. It attempts both to protect individual rights and articulate
values that remain central to communal life. The counter language's
integration of negative and positive accounts of human freedom
contrasts with liberal theory's propensity to define freedom in terms of
the absence of constraints on individual autonomy. When freedom is
conceived of primarily in negative terms, rights language tends to foster
an image of the individual who is in possession of unrestricted freedom
278. E.g. Gaudium el Spes, supra n. 14, at 972-973 (recognizing the right to work and to
remuneration that affords a dignified livelihood for individuals and families).
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to pursue private ends.279
This linguistic tendency is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in
the growing conflict between the individual and the family.28° The
primacy of the subjective self is evident in the frequency of divorce with
its negative consequences for the objective social reality of marriage and
family.281 It is also a constitutive aspect of the "substantive due process"
right designed by the United States Supreme Court In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court struck down a state statute that criminalized the
use of contraceptives "for the purpose of preventing conception."
Appealing to the sacredness of marriage, the Court described the statute
as "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship. 2 12 The privacy right protecting the distribution and use of
contraceptives was extended to non-married individuals in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.283 This legal reasoning then supplied the justification for the right
of a woman to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade. 84 Thus, the privacy
right, which the Court initially justified on the "sacred character" of
marriage, was extended to include constitutional protection for
individuals to distribute and use contraception outside marriage as well
as to perform and have abortions.28 5
The transition in reasoning from Griswold to Eisenstadt and
beyond represents a movement from a balanced concept of freedom to a
negative one. The counter language comports with the part of Griswold
that recognizes the natural and sacred values of family life. Marriage
279. John Paul II, supra n. 80, at 32 ("The individual conscience is accorded the status of a
supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about
good and evil.").
280. Linda J. Waite & Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage: Why Married People are
Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially 10 (Doubleday 2000) (indicating that married
persons, who have not been divorced, and their children tend to be better off in terms of physical
and emotional health as well as financial status than divorced spouses and their progeny); and
Judith Wallerstein, Julia Lewis & Sandra Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25
Year Landmark Study 294-316 (Hyperion 2000) (on the basis of a twenty-five year longitudinal
study of divorce, concluding that the "divorce culture" yields long term negative consequences for
individuals, families and society).
281. Waite & Gallagher, supra n. 280, at 187-188, citing Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1997 Table 145 (117th ed. 1997) (noting the statistical indication
that during the last years of the twentieth century the national divorce rate has leveled-off at
approximately fifty percent of all marriages and may be slightly declining).
282. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
283. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
284. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
285. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the majority of the Court refused to extend
the privacy right to homosexual activity in that such activity was neither "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." By a five to four
vote, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in Bowers, in the 2003 case Lawrence v. Tex., 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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and family life remain the most fundamental forms of participation and
solidarity in human experience. These social structures correspond to a
positive conception of freedom at the foundation of the societal order.
In Eisenstadt, the Court apparently was unable to distinguish the natural
and sacred positive values from the subjective choice of an individual.
Equality required that freedom be defined negatively as the absence of
government constraint on the autonomous individual. The Court's
concern for autonomy precluded a consideration of the traditional
natural and theological justifications for considering marriage as
deserving of preferential treatment. The principles of autonomy and
equality were reinforced by government neutrality, which in the Court's
view prevented the legislative from endorsing other substantive values.
Apart from whether the particular decisions in this line of legal
reasoning are ultimately just, the judicial reasoning that underpins the
decisions calls into question the pedagogical function of the law. The
lesson taught by the Court's reasoning suggests the sovereignty of
individual choice against competing substantive values. Such a teaching
tends to diminish concern for the common good. From the
anthropological perspective, it reflects a concept of the human will in
which individual autonomy trumps all other principles. It creates a
dynamic between the individual and the state that diminishes the
function of mediating structures, such as the family, the most natural and
basic form of human association.8 6 The constitutional language of
individual privacy has led to a re-definition of the family's very nature
and meaning.8 7 Law rooted in the absolute sovereignty of the will
defines social institutions in accord with subjective individual
preference. Its account of the human good is predisposed to be limited
to the concepts of equality, autonomy and neutrality. Any fuller account
of the human good is likely to offend some subjective preference. The
result is primarily a negative conception of freedom.
The secular doctrine of the will's sovereignty and the negative
conception of freedom contrasts with the traditional theological
286. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged 146-147, 188-189
(Basic Books 1995) (arguing that excessive individualism weakens the family and consequently
undermines one of the principal sources of societal cohesion).
287. The trend toward redefinition of marriage through the recognition of the legal right was
apparent in Baker v. Vt., 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. S.Ct. 1999), where the Vermont Supreme Court held
that a same-sex couple may not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded to
heterosexual married couples pursuant to the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution. In Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 2003 WL22701313 (Mass. 2003), the highest
court in Massachusetts held that prohibiting the granting of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated the Commonwealth's constitution.
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understanding of free will. The unity of law and theology reflects
optimism about the possibilities with realism about the limitations of the
human will.288  The truth about the human situation contained in the
theological doctrine of a fallen human nature in need of redemption
forms one of the anthropological foundations of the Western tradition.28 9
The doctrine of original sin serves as a reminder that law itself is at least
partially necessary on account of the reality of evil. 290 Legal theory split
from the theological doctrine may fail to acknowledge the limitations
inherent to the human situation. It is thus prone to be burdened by
unrealistic expectations for building a perfect culture in the here and
now. 291 Ideals meant to express the aspirations of a culture are reduced
to immediate pragmatic demands that the legal system cannot possibly
attain. Transcendental ideals may be met with cynicism and despair
about government power rather than hope for the future.292
As a further consequence of the negative language of human
freedom, the natural reciprocity between rights and responsibilities fades
from consciousness in the discussion of legal rights theory.2 93 A danger
lies in a distortion of the correct proportions in the relations between the
individual and society. When the intellectus of the law knows only a
negative concept of freedom, the law lacks the necessary language to
form the societal will to act for the human good. Ultimately, it may
yield not human freedom but individual and societal wills that are
deprived of the natural social structures, which are necessary for genuine
human fulfillment.294
288. Summa Theologica, supra n. 15, at I-I, 95, 1 & 2 (discussing creation of the human
person in the state of grace lost through sin); and Gilson, supra n. 15, at 176 (referring to the
"radical metaphysical optimism" of St. Thomas's understanding).
289. Berman, supra n. 5, at 166-185 (describing the Judeo-Christian theological doctrines of
original sin, judgment and atonement and their implications for Western law).
290. Von Balthasar, supra n. 25, at 105-119 (describing how early Christian thinkers
conceived of the private ownership of property as a consequence of the Fall until Thomistic
thought gradually replaced this historical notion of natural law with one based upon a more
abstract concept of nature).
291. Song, supra n. 230, at 219 ("Without an eschatology which transcends and fulfils history,
the human aspiration for permanence and stability may translate itself into the project of seeking
the Kingdom of God on earth.").
292. Id. at 218-219 (describing the "religion of progress" as the "manic reaction to the despair"
of modern society that has lost the transcendent).
293. This is not to suggest that only a negative definition of human freedom is operative in
liberal theory. In his highly regarded statement of liberal theory, John Rawls argues in favor of
distributive justice. Rawls, supra n. 39, at 310-315 (arguing that in a well-ordered society, "a just
scheme gives each person his due").
294. According to the principle of subsidiarity of Catholic social teaching, the state ought not
to appropriate to itself that which can be accomplished by smaller natural associations of
individuals, groups and communities. For the classic statement of the principle, see Pope Pius XI,
Quadragesimo Anno, in Seven Great Encyclicals 125, 147 (William J. Gibbons ed., Paulist Press
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The analysis of the negative conception of freedom points to a
general contradiction in mainstream legal theory. The theory focuses on
equal opportunity for the autonomous individual to compete in a fair
market and participate in the political process.2 95 Yet, in order to
advance the conditions that secure the neutral market and open politics,
the liberal state also depends on individual sacrifice-sometimes of
heroic proportions. Legal theory's negative definition of freedom as the
absence of constraint lacks the positive meaning to justify the
transcendence of self-interest. In contrast, the theological language of
self-transcendence embodies the paradoxical human wisdom that
genuine human fulfillment cannot be separated from self-
transcendence.296
V. CONCLUSION
The unity of canon law and theological anthropology reflects the
search for truth at the core of the human intellect. Love for the truth
requires an understanding of practical reason that encompasses the
integration of somatic, emotional and intellectual functions. In
manifesting the intellect's power to comprehend basic human goods and
derivative principles, the CIC-1983 attests to the natural goodness of the
human person. The CIC-1983 encourages a course of human action in
accord with the natural rights and responsibilities that are ontologically
grounded in the human person. The fundamental rights and
responsibilities are enhanced by the CIC-1983's recognition of reason
and faith as complementary forms of human knowing. The inner
meaning or intellectus of the CIC-1983 is intended to set the optimal
conditions in which human nature is perfected by grace. The intellectus
serves as a counter language to law based upon liberal theory. Canon
law respects the abiding character of the human person throughout
history even as it requires a keen awareness of the human person who
acts in history to create meaning. The modem legal project is inclined to
respond to secular historical circumstance alone. The counter language
raises a question about the law's objectivity and consequently its power
to bind.
1963).
295. E.g. Nozick, supra n. 39, at 167-174 (arguing against distributive justice in the liberal
state on the ground that once anyone has justly acquired property it would be unjust for the State
to deprive the property holder for the purpose of aiding other persons).
296. E.g. von Balthasar, supra n. 14, at 275-304 (discussing the Christian Mysteries of death
and resurrection as the paradigm of self-sacrifice).
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The unity also promotes the capacity of the human will for trust of
others and something greater than the self. Canon law's balance
between negative and positive understandings of freedom encourages
the human person to exercise the will for participation and solidarity
with others. As exemplified by its regard for local communities such as
the parish, the CIC-1983 posits a harmony between individual dignity
and the common good. Law informed by a balanced account of the
human good fortifies the will to act in accord with the good in solidarity
with others. Canon law's positive language seems to offer a more
complete account of human freedom than that contained in liberal
theory, which tends to focus on liberty as the absence of constraint. Law
is elevated by the recognition of religious values and, in particular,
through the theological understanding of individual self-transcendence.
In attributing much significance to the transcendent, the CIC-1983
contains within its corpus the recognition of its function as a sacred
symbol. Its sacramental character of truth and trust points to the fullest
possibilities for the individual and community. The unity of canon law
and theological anthropology corresponds to the nature of the human
person as a dynamic whole, body and soul. Certainly, it remains
impossible to transpose perfectly the inner meaning into the legislative
text. Law alone cannot accomplish salvation. The canonists,
nevertheless, enjoy a tradition of fashioning law with an intelligent and
creative commitment to theological anthropology. That law aims to
foster the love for truth and capacity to trust which are essential to the
human person's spiritual progress. As a result, the unity of law and
theology elicits self-possession and self-transcendence. The unity
suggests something about the purpose of law. Law ought to promote the
highest spiritual dimension of human action. Perhaps, the vision of the
CIC-1983 lies beyond the reach of modem legal systems predicated
upon liberal theory. Nonetheless, the anthropological vision offers a
challenge and stimulus to the mainstream legal thought.
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